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REPORT

ATHLETIC DIRECTORS
MARTIN J. GREENBERG* & ALEXANDER W. EVRARD**

I.

INTRODUCTION – DEFINITION

An athletic director, more commonly referred to as an “AD,” is the
overseer of a university’s athletic enterprise, the chief executive officer (CEO)
of the athletic enterprise. In most instances, an athletic director is not a faculty
member, but a full-time administrator. In some instances, such as in the case of
David Williams at Vanderbilt University, the title is greater than that of athletic
director. Williams is not only an athletic director but also the Vice Chancellor
for Athletics and University Affairs. The athletic director is probably not as
well-known as the university’s head football or basketball coach, but his profile,
especially at large revenue producing programs, has been enhanced. In many
instances, athletic directors are not compensated as well as some of their head
coaches, but the demands of their jobs are similar to the demands of a CEO of
a major corporation.
Today, the role of athletic directors has been greatly expanded. Their job
is 24/7. No longer do they just manage an athletic enterprise, as their
responsibilities may include
1. negotiating multi-million dollar media and licensing rights

* Martin J. Greenberg is the managing member of the Law Office of Martin J. Greenberg, LLC, a
member of the National Sports Law Institute Board of Advisors, and an adjunct professor of law at
Marquette University Law School.
** Alexander W. Evrard is an attorney in Milwaukee, Wisconsin who will complete his M.B.A. in
June 2016 from Marquette University Graduate School of Management. He graduated from Marquette
University Law School in May 2015. Previously, he earned a B.G.S. in Economics and a minor in
Business Administration from the University of Kansas in May 2012. Mr. Evrard would like to thank
Martin J. Greenberg for this opportunity and for serving as an invaluable professor and mentor. He
would also like to thank his parents, Rick and Peggy, for their unconditional love and support. And a
special thanks to his uncle and aunt, Doug and Tracey, for providing a home away from home.
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agreements;
2. managing coaches who are “CEOs in Headphones” and the
highest paid state employees in a free agent environment;
3. acting as a legal wizard to master the compliance standards
expected of him and his programs by the NCAA, conference,
and university;
4. acting as a development specialist, dealing with capital
projects essential to keeping pace in the arms race of college
sports;
5. being a skilled businessman, dealing with balancing budgets,
controlling expenses, creating new revenues, and mastering the
bottom line;
6. displaying excellence in peer relationships in dealing with
his partners in the world of college conferences and what has
now become a re-alignment environment;
7. understanding the importance of academics to the athletic
enterprise and knowing the place of athletics within the
university environment;
8. serving as a master fundraiser, an expert at donor relations,
in that fundraising is an intricate component of the revenues
generated by universities; and
9. acting as a human resource strategist, in that athletic
departments are large employers, having many employees and
staff.
II.

JOB ENVIRONMENT

The job itself has become a much more sophisticated and pedigreed job
that requires experience and more formalized education. However, most of all,
the athletic director of today is the director of a big business. According to a
USA Today report, the average conference athletic department revenues for the
2013–2014 academic year were:
Big Ten
SEC
Big 12
Pac-12
ACC

$108.8 million
$105.3 million
$100.1 million
$88.6 million
$79 million
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Mountain West
Conference USA
MAC
A-10
CAA
Sun Belt
Big West
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$60.6 million
$38.2 million
$29.3 million
$27.5 million
$27.1 million
$25.7 million
$20.9 million
$20.6 million1

Revenues can skyrocket into the hundreds of millions. According to the
2013–2014 USA Today report, twenty universities generated more than $100
million in revenues and sixteen universities spent more than $100 million in
expenses,2 as shown by the chart below.
SCHOOL

CONFERENCE

REVENUE

EXPENSES

Oregon

Pac-12

$196,030,398

$110,378,432

Texas

Big 12

$161,035,187

$154,128,877

Michigan

Big Ten

$157,899,820

$142,551,994

Alabama

SEC

$153,234,273

$120,184,128

Big Ten

$145,232,681

$113,937,001

SEC

$133,679,256

$122,945,710

Oklahoma

Big 12

$129,226,692

$113,366,698

Wisconsin

Big Ten

$127,910,918

$125,096,235

SEC

$124,611,305

$109,690,016

Ohio State
LSU

Florida

1. See NCAA Finances, USA TODAY SPORTS, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last
visited May 8, 2016).
2. Id.
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SEC

$119,475,872

$95,663,483

Oklahoma
State

Big 12

$117,803,302

$109,648,000

Penn State

Big Ten

$117,590,990

$117,440,639

Auburn

SEC

$113,716,004

$126,470,602

Tennessee

SEC

$107,499,732

$106,153,854

Minnesota

Big Ten

$106,176,156

$106,176,156

Iowa

Big Ten

$105,958,954

$102,278,847

ACC

$104,774,474

$98,866,182

Big Ten

$104,677,456

$107,422,832

SEC

$103,495,587

$92,560,956

Washington

Pac-12

$100,275,187

$86,097,137

Arizona

Pac-12

$99,911,034

$95,524,260

SEC

$98,619,479

$95,762,786

Big 12

$97,681,066

$90,056,511

Arkansas

SEC

$96,793,972

$94,640,408

Kentucky

SEC

$96,685,489

$94,612,431

Florida
State
Michigan
State
Georgia

South Carolina
Kansas
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Research identifies several common paths that current athletic directors
took to arrive at their positions as head athletic directors.3 These paths include:
1.Head Coach Path (i.e., from head coach of a sport to athletic
director), such as Barry Alvarez of the University of Wisconsin,
Mike Holder of Oklahoma State University, Debbie Yow of
North Carolina State University, and Ray Tanner of the
University of South Carolina;
2.Athletic Administration Path (i.e., working their way up
through an athletic department), such as Kirby Hocutt of Texas
Tech University, Brad Bates of Boston College, and Bubba
Cunningham of the University of North Carolina;
3.Sports Management Education Path (i.e., athletic directors
who pursued graduate studies in the field of sports management
to prepare for their careers), such as Sandy Barbour of Penn
State University, Jeremy Foley of the University of Florida, Ian
McCaw of Baylor University, Bob DeCarolis of Oregon State
University, and Bernard Muir of Stanford University;
4.Sports Industry Experience Path (i.e., non-college sports
industry experience to athletic director), such as Ray Anderson
of Arizona State University, Rick George of the University of
Colorado, Jack Swarbrick of the University of Notre Dame, and
Stephen Patterson formerly of the University of Texas; and
5.Business Experience Path (i.e., major corporate and business
experience to athletic director), such as Dave Brandon formerly
of the University of Michigan and Pat Haden of the University
of Southern California.4
“As college sports have become increasingly big businesses, more
institutions have made similar assessments and turned to outside business
executives to run their programs – but it’s not yet clear that the shift in preferred
skill sets is paying off.”5

3. See Glenn M. Wong, The Path to the Athletic Director’s Office, SPORTS BUS. J. (June 9, 2014),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/06/09/In-Depth/Wong-column.aspx.
4. Id.
5. Jake New, What CEOs Don’t Know, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/11/07/colleges-turn-athletics-directors-business-backgrounds-results-vary.
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When the University of Michigan chose David Brandon to be
its athletics director in 2010, the university touted his
experience as the chief executive officer of Domino’s Pizza. At
the time, the university saw his understanding of how to run a
multibillion-dollar company as a fitting background for running
a big-time college sports program.
....
About 10 percent of Division I colleges currently have athletic
directors with backgrounds in business rather than college
sports. Nine out of the 65 institutions that make up the so-called
Power 5 conferences have hired executives to run their sports
programs. Glenn Wong, a sports management professor at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, said the number of
schools may still be relatively small, but they’re part of a larger
trend.
“The trend is that schools will now consider athletic director
candidates with nontraditional backgrounds,” Wong said. “In
fact, they may even seek them out. But institutions vary
considerably in terms of what they are looking for in an athletic
director. It can vary from one hire to the next. For example, an
athletic director may be brought in to clean up after an NCAA
problem, and the next hire may be someone with strength in
fund raising.”6
A University of Michigan (Michigan) alumnus, David Brandon, played
football under Bo Schembechler and was a member of three Big Ten
Championship teams.7 He received
a Bachelor of Arts degree in education and teaching . . . from
[Michigan] in 1974. . . . He was elected to the Board of
Regents in 1998 and served one eight-year term. In 2007 he
received the Distinguished Alumni Service Award from the
[Michigan] Alumni Association. In 2008 he received the
Bennie Oosterbaan Award for service, dedication and

6. Id.
7. Kim Broekhuizen, David Brandon Named Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, U. MICH.
OFFICIAL ATHLETIC SITE (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.mgoblue.com/genrel/010510aab.html.
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leadership from the Bob Ufer Quarterback Club. Later that year
Brandon was honored as national CEO Coach of the Year by
the American Football Coaches Association.8
Prior to joining the athletic department, Brandon served as Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of Ann Arbor-based Domino's Pizza, Inc. for eleven
years, leading the company to the largest initial public offering (IPO) of a
restaurant company in history.9 He continues to serve as non-executive
Chairman at Domino’s and also serves as a member of the Board of Directors
of Herman Miller and DTE Energy. Prior to his role with Domino’s, Brandon
served as Chairman, President, and CEO of Valassis Communications, Inc.10
While Brandon was the athletic director at Michigan, he increased revenues,
improved facilities, won games, and consistently brought in a profit for the
athletic department, which is rare for collegiate athletics; however, in the end,
students and alumni alike called for his dismissal. Why? One contributing
factor is that Brandon repeatedly tried to break, and did break, traditions at
Michigan in attempts to improve components of the athletic program. In 2011,
Brandon “raised ticket prices for the first time in seven years” and altered the
traditional football jerseys.11 He was criticized for trying to bring back retired
jersey numbers and put them on special players.12 Additionally, Brandon made
alternate uniforms for the football team to wear to surprise the fans.13 The
Board of Regents criticized Brandon for trying to shoot off fireworks during
home games at Michigan Stadium (The Big House), claiming it would cheapen
the traditional game-day experience.14
Brandon alienated students and other fans by increasing ticket prices and
changing student seating arrangements. Instead of running Michigan like a
business, Brandon was running Michigan as a business. Former Michigan
athletic director Bill Martin once said to Brandon, “[j]ust because you can
charge them more . . . doesn’t mean you should. You’re not there to ring up the
cash to the nth degree. It’s a nonprofit model!”15 This is illustrated by the wait

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. David Jesse & Mark Snyder, Michigan Athletic Director Dave Brandon Resigns, USA TODAY
(Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/10/31/michigan-athletic-directordave-brandon/18236245/.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. John U. Bacon, How Michigan’s Greed Alienated Fans: A Cautionary Tale for All College
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list for Michigan football tickets.16 Back when multi-millionaire businessman
Don Canham was athletic director at Michigan, he knew that he could maximize
revenue by increasing prices to meet demand.17 However, he did not increase
ticket prices “because he believed that would dispel the magic of Michigan
Stadium.”18 Similarly, Brandon’s predecessor Bill Martin actually lowered
ticket prices after the 2008 recession, and the wait list held strong even after two
terrible losing seasons in 2008 and 2009.19 As of 2014, after Brandon increased
ticket prices and also phased in a personal seat license, which requires every
season-ticket holder to pay a fee for the right to buy tickets, the wait list
disappeared.20
Brandon also created friction with the student body by raising ticket prices
from $195 for six games to $295 for seven games.21 Additionally, Brandon
broke a decade’s long tradition by rearranging student seating from being based
on seniority to a first-come, first-served system.22 In 2014, Michigan student
body president Bobby Dishell stated that, “[d]rastic measures need to be taken
to demonstrate the athletic department values its students beyond the revenue
dollars they bring in when they purchase tickets.”23
Fans prepared an organized protest “White Out, Dave Out,” wearing
anti-Brandon T-shirts for Michigan’s 2014 homecoming game against the
University of Indiana.24 Brandon finally resigned in October of 2014, even
though his contract was extended through June 2018.25 Brandon was replaced
on an interim basis by Jim Hackett, a 1977 Michigan graduate and former
football team member under coach Bo Schembechler, who returned to Michigan
after two decades as Chief Executive Officer of Grand Rapids-based SteelCase,
Inc., one of the world’s largest office furniture makers.26
Hackett’s appointment letter with Michigan is dated October 31, 2014, the

Football, THEPOSTGAME (June 23, 2014), http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/road-saturday/201406/
college-football-fan-stadium-students-business-tv-ncaa-michigan-tickets.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Jesse & Snyder, supra note 11.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
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same day as Brandon’s resignation.27 The letter outlines the terms of his
indefinite appointment and calls for an annual salary of $600,000.28
Meanwhile, Brandon executed a Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims
with Michigan, dated October 30, 2014, in which he would be compensated for
the remaining term of his contract.29
Stephen Patterson (Patterson) obtained his undergraduate and law degrees
from the University of Texas (UT or Texas)30 and experienced first-hand the
transformative power of the Forty Acres. “He succeeded DeLoss Dodds who
served as UT men’s athletics director from 1981-2013.”31 Prior to serving as
Athletic Director of Arizona State University (2012–2013),
Patterson worked for more than two decades in professional
sports as an executive with the NFL’s Houston Texans, the
NBA’s Houston Rockets and Portland Trail Blazers, as well as
the Houston Aeros hockey team. He also served as president of
Pro Sports Consulting.
As President of the Portland Trail Blazers, The Rose Garden
and Rose City Radio from 2003-07, Patterson was responsible
for all business and basketball operations for the team and
arena, as well as local media outlets. Patterson engineered a
record six draft-day trades that resulted in the selection of NBA
Rookie of the Year and three time NBA All-Star Brandon Roy
and fellow All-Rookie First Team, NBA All-Star, and
All-NBA member LaMarcus Aldridge, a former Longhorn
standout.
From 1997-2003, Patterson served as the Senior Vice President
and Chief Development Officer of the Houston Texans NFL
franchise where he led Bob McNair’s successful effort to

27. Employment Agreement with James Hackett, Univ. of Mich. (Oct. 31, 2014); Settlement
Agreement By and Between The University of Michigan and David A. Brandon, Univ. of Mich. (Oct.
30, 2014).
28. Employment Agreement with James Hackett, supra note 27.
29. Settlement Agreement By and Between The University of Michigan and David A. Brandon, supra
note 27, ¶ 2.
30. Athletics Director Steve Patterson, TEX. LONGHORNS ATHLETICS, http://www.texassports.com/sports/2013/11/5/GEN_1105131632.aspx?id=476 (last visited May 25, 2016).
31. Id.
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acquire a National Football League franchise and Super Bowl
XXXVIII for Houston, Texas. Patterson was responsible for the
establishment of the team’s business, legal, media and political
operations, as well as the development, design, finance and
construction of Reliant Stadium.
Prior to joining the Texans, Patterson was the President,
General Manager and Governor of the Houston Aeros hockey
team. For his efforts there, he was named the 1995 winner of
the Andy Mulligan Trophy as the International Hockey
League’s Executive of the Year. In addition to his roles with
the Aeros, Patterson also acquired and served as President and
Partner in Arena Operating Company, which managed and
operated Compaq Center, Houston’s home of the Rockets,
Aeros and Comets.
As General Manager of the Houston Rockets from 1989-93, he
was the primary architect of the 1993-1994 Houston Rockets
squad that captured the first NBA World Championship in
franchise history, signing or trading for all the team’s players
and coaches. Patterson also led the club’s successful bid to host
the 1989 NBA All-Star Game, which held the all-time
attendance record of 44,735 [fans] for 21 years.32
Despite Patterson’s impressive track record, there are several
explanations for his termination on September 15, 2015. Nearly all of
Patterson’s long résumé, save for a twenty month tenure at Arizona State
University, consisted of positions held in professional sports. Similar to
Brandon’s attempt to run the Michigan athletic department as a business,
Patterson tried to change the unique collegiate athletics environment at Texas.
“According to his critics, he turned longtime Longhorns fans, season-ticket
holders and boosters into faceless customers, and fired or forced out many
veteran athletic department employees, many of whom were proud Texas
alumni.”33 This included Rick Barnes, Head Basketball Coach and a

32. Id.
33. Mark Schlabach, The Steve Patterson Era at Texas: ‘He Just Put Us Through Hell,’ ESPN (Sept.
18, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13683231/the-steve-patterson-era-texas-justput-us-hell.
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seventeen-year veteran of Texas, and Mack Brown, Head Football Coach and a
sixteen-year veteran of Texas. Patterson deviated from the norm, including
“rais[ing] ticket prices in men’s basketball and football, mov[ing] the stadium
seats of faculty members and former lettermen,” charging fans to use prime
tailgating spots around campus, and “eliminat[ing] complimentary meals in
dining halls and other perks for coaches and athletic department employees.”34
After the ticket price increase, about 10,000 football tickets were not renewed
for the 2015 season.35
Patterson has also been criticized for not settling the lawsuit commenced
by Oklahoma State University (Oklahoma State) against Joe Wickline for
breach of contract and $600,000 in damages for making a lateral move to
Texas.36 “Patterson has maintained from the beginning this was an issue
between Wickline and Oklahoma State” and Texas was not a named party in the
lawsuit.37 Wickline left Oklahoma State after the 2013 season to become the
Co-offensive Coordinator at Texas. Wickline’s contract with Oklahoma State
stated that for him to leave the university before the end of his contract, he must
either become an NFL coach or a college offensive coordinator with play calling
duties.38 Oklahoma State Athletic Director Mike Holder and Football Coach
Mike Gundy did not believe Wickline was calling plays for the Texas
Longhorns, thus making a lateral move in going to Texas, and filed suit for
damages under the contract with Wickline.39 Mike Perrin, the new athletic
director for Texas said Oklahoma State’s lawsuit against Wickline was a
distraction and the same would be settled short of a trial.40
University of Texas President Greg Fenves sums up the important role of
the athletics department when he refers to it as “the front door to the
university.”41 Football and basketball coaches are sometimes the faces of the

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Brian Davis, Oklahoma State, Wickline Trial Likely to Start After Football Season,
MYSTATESMAN (July 24, 2015), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/sports/college-football/oklahoma-state-joe-wickline-likely-to-start-trial-/nm6FW/.
37. Id.
38. Tom Fornelli, Texas Off. Coordinator Wickline Files Lawsuit Against Oklahoma State, CBS
SPORTS
(Oct.
23,
2014),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/24764494/texas-offensive-coordinator-files-a-lawsuit-against-oklahoma-state.
39. Davis, supra note 36.
40. Ryan Autullo, Mike Perrin Calls Joe Wickline Lawsuit ‘a Distraction,’ HOOKEM (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.hookem.com/2015/10/03/mike-perrin-calls-joe-wickline-lawsuit-a-distraction/.
41. Jori Epstein, If Texas Athletics Is the Front Door of the University, Steve Patterson Is the Doorman, DAILY TEXAN (July 20, 2015), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2015/07/20/if-texas-athleticsis-the-front-door-of-the-university-steve-patterson-is-the-doorman (emphasis added).
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athletic department and even the university, but Patterson treated them like
secondary employees.42
The athletic director of today performs many roles other than just managing
the athletic department. Patterson did not take on some of the additional roles
such as “schmoozing fans to haul in donations,” and it was unclear to multiple
athletic officials what Patterson’s primary responsibility actually was. 43 One
crucial athletic director attribute that Patterson struggled with was his colleague
relationships. Fenves once commented that Patterson was “impersonal or even
arrogant.”44 Patterson also neglected his head football coach by refusing to
increase salaries for his analysts; “[s]ix of the eight analysts left for other
jobs.”45 “In Texas . . . [y]ou’ve got to know how to communicate to good ol’
boys . . . .”46 Fans were upset enough that they even flew a banner over
Royal-Texas Memorial Stadium that read “Patterson Must Go.”47
In the wake of Patterson’s termination, he will receive a hearty percentage
of the remaining compensation on his contract.48 After serving as the men’s
athletic director at Texas for less than two years, Patterson still had about $4
million left on his contract ($1.4 million annually).49 “[T]he University of
Texas Board of Regents approved a settlement with Patterson that will,
according to reports, pay Patterson up to two full years’ salary, depending on
his compensation at his next gig. At least $1.4 million of the settlement is
guaranteed.”50
The athletic director of today must have an intricate understanding of the
culture of intercollegiate athletics as understood by other university personnel
other than the athletic department, a culture that has been suggested to be a
highly organized commercial enterprise with a powerhouse mentality that
favors entertainment over education and utilizes a corporate model, rather than
an educational model. A culture where the primary focus may be athletics,
rather than academics, escalates expenditures in the chase for the dollar which
ultimately results in the diversion of academic dollars to the sports fields. The

42. Schlabach, supra note 33.
43. Epstein, supra note 41 (emphasis added).
44. Schlabach, supra note 33.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Stephen Young, UT Blows a Couple Million on Athletic Director It Never Should Have Hired,
DALLAS OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/ut-blows-a-couple-millionon-athletic-director-it-never-should-have-hired-7626658.
50. Id.
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athletic department has been characterized by interlocking relationships with
private sector companies that result in numerous scandals in the world of
amateur sports, and as an enterprise that is non-sustainable and will ultimately
put an end to the primary and academic purpose of the university. An athletic
director needs specialized skills, not only business skills but also an astute
understanding of the university environment, university rules and regulations,
the inter-relationship between academics and athletes and must be a team player
in understanding the academic environment. In essence, it does not make any
difference how much education, business experience, or bottom line success
someone has in business, a person must also know and be able to work in and
become part of a university system and understand the thinking of not only the
administrators but also the academics, as it relates to the athletic enterprise.
III. ATHLETIC DIRECTOR CONTRACTS – AN INTRODUCTION
Athletic director contracts are agreements that are institutionally
produced, most likely, by university counsel. They can be long, they can be
sophisticated, they can contain all the legalese of a coach’s contract, and in most
instances, closely resemble the contracts of coaches representing the university.
Because, in most instances, the same counsel is drafting the contract for both
the coach and the athletic director, the checklist elements in Author Greenberg’s
article Checklist for Negotiating and Drafting of Coaches’ Employment
Agreements is a useful tool to assist in negotiating an athletic director’s
contract.51 Athletic director contracts are highlighted by a list of duties, a
compensation package, and of course, termination provisions.
As previously noted, the athletic director of today is the CEO of the
athletic enterprise. An athletic director’s duties go way beyond simply
managing a university’s athletic department: budget management, revenue
generation, rules compliance, alumni and donor relations, fundraising, capital
improvements, and hiring and firing coaches are just some of the increasing
responsibilities that an athletic director now must undertake as part of the job.
There is no standard form athletic director contract, just like there is no
standard form for coaches’ contracts. This is dissimilar from professional sports
leagues, where standard contracts for all players are mutually negotiated
between the union and management pursuant to some form of collective
bargaining or basic agreement. There are no unions representing athletic
directors, although they have formed the National Association of Collegiate

51. See Martin J. Greenberg, Checklist for Negotiating and Drafting of Coaches’ Employment
Agreements, THE LAW OFF. OF MARTIN J. GREENBERG (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.greenberglawoffice.com/checklist-negotiating-drafting-coaches-employment-agreements/.
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Directors of Athletics (NACDA), a professional organization that “provid[es]
educational opportunities and serves as a vehicle for networking and the
exchange of information to others in the profession.”52
Because athletic director contracts are a sophisticated legal endeavor,
consultation with a competent attorney who is familiar with the elements of
athletic director contracts, familiar with the culture and negotiation of university
contracts, and has adept negotiation skills would be most helpful to produce the
best contract product.
A.

General Duties of an Athletic Director

A good example of a listing of athletic director duties and responsibilities
was found in the contract of former University of Texas Athletic Director
Stephen Patterson. Patterson’s Employment Agreement with Texas recites the
following duties and responsibilities:
A. Recognition of Duties. Subject to the other provisions of
this Agreement, the Athletics Director shall devote his best
efforts full-time to leadership, supervision, and promotion
of the Program. Athletics Director will report directly to,
and act and perform to the reasonable satisfaction of the
President of The University of Texas at Austin, who will
determine Athletics Director’s duties and responsibilities.
B. General Duties and Responsibilities. In his position as
Athletics Director, he is responsible for the duties normally
associated with an athletics director at a Division I
university including: maintaining a high level of
leadership, having a strong commitment to the University’s
expectations for an athletics program run with integrity,
student-athlete academic success and progress to
graduation, high athletic achievement, financial solvency,
student-athlete conduct and welfare, compliance with the
Governing Athletic Rules and University Rules, personnel
supervision and evaluation, scheduling assistance,
promotions, public relations, development activities, and
the overall effective performance of the Program’s

52. What Is NACDA and What Does It Do?, NACDA, http://www.nacda.com/nacda/nacda-overview.html (last visited May 25, 2016).

GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

7/26/2016 4:50 PM

ATHLETI C DI RECTORS
student-athletes and coaching staff.
C. Specific Duties and Responsibilities.
Duties and
responsibilities assigned to the Athletics Director in
connection with the Program are set forth below. The list
of specific duties and responsibilities supplements, and is
not exclusive of, other general duties and responsibilities
provided for elsewhere in this Agreement. The specific
responsibilities of the position include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(1) Be responsible for, along with University’s Women’s
Athletics Director, creating, enforcing, interpreting,
and reviewing University’s intercollegiate athletics
policies, procedures, and strategic plan;
(2) Assure that the Program has plans, policies,
procedures, and programs that comply with the
Governing Athletics Rules and University Rules, and
that promote the mission of the University, the
University’s high standard of academic excellence, and
the general welfare of student-athletes;
(3) Understand, observe, and uphold all academic
standards and requirements of the University,
including the University Rules, Governing Athletic
Rules, and all state and federal laws, and ensure
compliance by coaches and other personnel in the
Program;
(4) Use his best efforts to ensure that all academic
standards, requirements, University Rules, and
Governing Athletic Rules are observed, including
those in connection with recruiting and eligibility of
prospective and current student-athletes who are
academically qualified;
(5) Develop procedures and programs that assure the
welfare of student-athletes; ensure that coaching and
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administrative staff actively support the Program’s and
the University’s joint commitment to academic
achievement for each student-athlete, to include
promoting academic advising and counseling services;
maintain an environment in which the pursuit of higher
education is a priority as reflected by class attendance,
grade point averages, the NCAA academic progress
rates (APR), and the NCAA and federal graduation
rates;
(6) Promote athletic excellence and a competitive program
for men’s intercollegiate varsity sports programs;
(7) Be responsible for the recruitment, hiring, and the
terms and conditions of employment of all men’s head
coaches, with consultation and approval by the
President;
(8) Maintain responsibility for the supervision and conduct
of the head coaches and their activities; this
responsibility shall include, without limitation,
providing annul evaluations of such head coaches;
(9) Maintain responsibility for hiring and supervising all
administrative and other personnel as deemed
appropriate for the proper and effective functioning of
the Program;
(10)Maintain effective working relationships with relevant
constituencies, including associations, conferences,
committees, alumni, students, faculty, administrators,
and staff;
(11)Ensure the fiscal integrity of the Program; develop
plans and budgets; raise private funds; and, monitor the
expenditure of all funds in the Program consistent with
all state and federal laws, University Rules, and
Governing Athletic Rules;
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(12)Identify needs for capital construction, renovation and
repairs; negotiate and recommend appropriate
broadcast, sports marketing, apparel, shoe, and other
sponsorship arrangements, etc.;
(13)Consult regularly with athletics compliance staff
regarding the interpretation of applicable rules, and
bring any differences of opinion to the President for
resolution; assist the athletics compliance staff or other
designated individuals in reviewing and/or
investigating alleged violations of a University Rule or
Governing Athletic Rule;
(14)Promote the University’s commitment to equal
opportunity and compliance with Title IX;
(15)Maintain responsibility for overseeing all aspects of
the administration of the varsity sports in the Program;
and
(16)Perform such other duties as assigned by the President.
D. NCAA and Other Governing Athletic Rules and University
Rules.
(1) Athletics Director agrees to know, recognize, and
comply in all respects with NCAA and other
Governing Athletic Rules and University Rules. In the
performance of his duties and obligations under this
Agreement, Athletics Director will abide by and
comply with all Governing Athletic Rules and
University Rules and all decisions of the President.
Violations of any Governing Athletic Rules or
University Rules by Athletics Director will be
sufficient cause for disciplinary action.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of Athletics Director to
promote an atmosphere of compliance within the
Program and to monitor the activities regarding
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compliance of all coaches and other administrators
involved with the Program who report directly or
indirectly to Athletics Director. If, at any time during
the Term of this Agreement, Athletics Director knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, that any coach,
student-athlete, student, faculty member, or agent or
employee of the University, or any outside individual
has violated, or allowed or caused to be violated, any
Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules, or if
Athletics Director receives notice or information that
the NCAA or the Conference intends to investigate or
to review any alleged violations of Governing Athletic
Rules or University Rules, or if Athletics Director
receives notice or information that any law is alleged
to have been violated by any student-athlete, coach,
administrator, or staff member, including himself, he
must immediately report such information, knowledge,
or belief to the athletics compliance staff and to the
President as appropriate.
(3) If Athletics Director is found to be in violation of
Governing Athletic Rules, whether while employed by
the University or during prior employment at another
NCAA member institution, Athletics Director shall be
subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth
in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement
procedures, including suspension without pay, or the
employment of Athletics Director may be terminated
as provided in Section 7.A of this Agreement.53
By way of comparison, what follows is a position summary outlining the
duties and responsibilities for the position of athletic director posted by the
University of Louisville:

53. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, ¶ 4, Univ. of Tex. at Austin
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://projects.statesman.com/documents/?doc=2161183-steve-patterson-contract.
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I. Position Summary
The Vice President for Athletics reports directly to the
President. This position is the responsible officer for the
University of Louisville Athletic Association., and serves
as athletic director. The VP for Athletics is authorized to
act for the ULAA, in carrying out the functions according
to the terms and conditions of the Management Agreement
and Agency Agreement between the University and the
ULAA. The Vice President shall advise the president on
all matters relating to the university’s strategic objectives
in the areas of intercollegiate athletics.
II. Individual Responsibilities
1. Integrate the Athletic Department and University into a
more cohesive environment and improve communication
and maximize public perception.
2. Ensure a total emphasis and focus on improving
graduation rates and academic success of the
student-athletes.
3. Recommend an annual budget for approval by the
ULAA board[.]
4. Manage the operational, financial and personnel
activities of Intercollegiate Athletics[.]
5. Make arrangements for all intercollegiate contests
including game contracts, facilities contracts and all usual
and customary duties ordinarily undertaken by the home
team[.]
6. Contract for all services for Intercollegiate Athletics
through normal University of Louisville business
procedures[.]
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7. Recommend to the ULAA Board of Directors new
policies and programs for Intercollegiate Athletics[.]
8. Evaluate existing athletic facilities and recommend
improvements as needed[.]
9. Advance UofL’s commitment to gender equity under
Title IX—particularly through fundraising and planning.
10. Promote student, faculty, staff and public interest in
Intercollegiate Athletics[.]
11. Build upon successful marketing relationships to
promote the marketing, licensing, and merchandising
associated with UofL sports[.]
12. Raise endowments and other private financial support
for Intercollegiate Athletics pursuant to the policies of
ULAA[.]
13. Maintain current knowledge of NCAA and applicable
conference regulations and promote “zero tolerance” for
infractions through education and enforcement[.]
14. Assure effective communications with FAR and all
Board committees[.]
15. Make recommendations to the Board of Directors of
ULAA with respect to appointment and retention of all
associate athletic directors and conduct annual
performance evaluations thereof[.]
16. Make recommendations to the Personnel Committee of
the Board of Directors with respect to employment of all
full-time head coaches and to conduct annual performance
evaluations of said coaches taking action to adjust salary,
renew contract, or terminate employment, provided that
any compensation arrangements for coaches which require
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action of the Board of Directors for safe harbor treatment
under IRS intermediate sanctions regulations shall be
referred to the full Board for prior approval[.]
17. Interview, select and evaluate the performance of all
assistant athletic directors, part-time head coaches, and
support staff[.]
18. Review and approve or disapprove the selection,
retention and evaluation of all assistant coaches by the head
coach of the sport[.]
19. Ensure that the operation of the unit fulfills the
academic mission of the University.54
In conclusion, and based upon a review of numerous athletic director
contracts, athletic director duties and responsibilities encompass some or all of
the following:
1.Budget and fiscal management of the athletic department;
2.Revenue generation;
3.Arrange for athletic contests;
4.Contract for services;
5.Rules compliance;
6.Hire and fire head collegiate coaches;
7.Representing the athletic department to external constituents;
8.Fundraising;
9.Alumni relations; and
10.Capital projects.
B.

Term of Athletic Director Contracts

Colleges and universities are making long term commitments to individuals
they choose as their athletic directors. The standard term in the industry today

54. VICE PRESIDENT FOR ATHLETICS POSITION DESCRIPTION, LOUISVILLE ATHLETICS (n.d.),
http://louisville.edu/athletics/vpathjobdescription.pdf.
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is somewhere in the area of a five-year initial term. What follows are some
examples of contract terms in various athletic director contracts:
Athletic Director

University

Original Term Length
(years)

Barry Alvarez

University of Wisconsin

Feb. 2006 – Jan. 2011 (5)55

Shawn M. Eichorst

University of Nebraska

Jan. 2013 – Dec. 2017 (5)56

Kevin Anderson

University of Maryland

Oct. 2010 – Sept. 2015 (5)57

Michael J. Thomas

University of Illinois

Aug. 2011 – Aug. 2016 (5)58

Oliver Luck

West Virginia
University

June 2010 – June 2015 (5)59

Mark Coyle

Boise State University

Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2016 (5)60

Pedro A. Garcia

Florida International
University

Oct. 2011 – Oct. 2016 (5)61

C. Jeffrey Compher

East Carolina University

Apr. 2013 – Apr. 2018 (5)62

Heather Lyke

Eastern Michigan
University

July 2013 – July 2018 (5)63

55. Employment Agreement Between Division of Intercollegiate Athletics University of WisconsinMadison and Barry Alvarez (Athletic Director), ¶ II(A), Univ. of Wis.-Madison (Feb. 1, 2006).
56. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics University
of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, § 1, Univ. of Neb.-Lincoln (Jan. 1, 2013).
57. University of Maryland Athletic Director Agreement with Kevin Anderson, ¶ 2, Univ. of Md.
(Oct. 1, 2010).
58. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, ¶ 3, Univ. of Ill. (Aug. 29, 2011).
59. Employment Agreement with Oliver Luck, W. Va. Univ. (June 30, 2010).
60. Employment Agreement with Mark Coyle, art. 2.1, Boise State Univ. (Dec. 1, 2011).
61. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, ¶ I(k), Fla. Int’l
Univ. (Oct. 16, 2011).
62. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, ¶ I, A., E. Carolina Univ.
(Apr. 30, 2013).
63. Eastern Michigan University Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agreement with
Heather Lyke, ¶ 2.1, E. Mich. Univ. (June 28, 2013).
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Michael O’Brien

University of Toledo

July 2007 – July 2010 (3)64

Thomas Wistrcill

University of Akron

Sept. 2009 – Sept. 2014 (5)65

Jeremy N. Foley

University of Florida

Feb. 1997 – Jan. 2002 (5)66

Joseph L. Alleva

Louisiana State
University

July 2008 – June 2013 (5)67

William R. Battle III

University of Alabama

Mar. 2013 – June 2017 (4)68

Donald Ray Tanner Jr.

University of South
Carolina

Aug. 2012 – June 2017 (5)69

Michael A. Bobinski

Georgia Tech University

Apr. 2013 – June 2018 (5)70

Julie K. Hermann

Rutgers University

June 2013 – June 2018 (5)71

Stephen Patterson

University of Texas at
Austin

Nov. 2013 – Aug. 2019 (6)72

Mike Holder

Oklahoma State
University

July 2011 – June 2016 (5)73

Joseph R. Castiglione

University of Oklahoma

July 2011 – June 2017 (6)74

Michael F. Alden

University of Missouri

July 2009 – June 2019 (10)75

64. Employment Contract with Michael O’Brien, Univ. of Toledo (July 27, 2007).
65. Employment Agreement with Thomas Wistrcill, ¶ 4.1, Univ. of Akron (Sept. 9, 2010).
66. University of Florida Employment Contract Athletic Director with Jeremy N. Foley, ¶ 4(A),
Univ. of Fla. (Feb. 1, 1997).
67. Employment Agreement with Joseph L. Alleva, ¶ 3, La. State Univ. (Apr. 28, 2008).
68. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, art. III, Univ. of Ala. (Mar. 21, 2013).
69. Employment Agreement with Donald Ray Tanner, Jr., ¶ 3.01, Univ. of S.C. (Aug. 2, 2012).
70. Employment Contract with Michael A. Bobinski, art I, Ga. Tech Athletic Ass’n (Apr. 1, 2013).
71. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, ¶ I, State Univ. of N.J. (June 16, 2013).
72. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 3.
73. Employment Contract with Mike Holder, ¶ 1, Okla. State Univ. (July 1, 2011).
74. Employment Agreement with Joseph R. Castiglione, ¶ 3, Univ. of Okla. (July 1, 2011).
75. Restated Contract for Employment with Michael F. Alden, ¶ 1, Univ. of Mo. (Aug. 28, 2012).
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Stan Wilcox

Florida State University

Aug. 2013 – Aug. 2018 (5)76

Raymond Anderson

Arizona State University

Feb. 2014 – Feb. 2019 (5)77

David Heeke

Central Michigan
University

Nov. 2013 – Dec. 2017 (4)78

Daniel J. Schumacher

Chicago State
University

June 2012 – June 2016 (4)79

Daniel Radakovich, Jr.

Clemson University

Dec. 2012 – June 2018 (5.5)80

Josiah C. Hull, Jr.

College of Charleston

Jan. 2008 – Dec. 2012 (5)81

Mark Sandy

Eastern Kentucky
University

July 2005 – June 2009 (4)82

William Chaves, Jr.

Eastern Washington
University

July 2013 – June 2018 (5)83

Cheryl Levick

Georgia State University

Mar. 2009 – June 2014 (5)84

Jeffrey K. Tingey

Idaho State University

July 2011 – June 2014 (3)85

Ronald Prettyman

Indiana State University

Mar. 2011 – June 2016 (5)86

76. 2013 Employment Agreement with Stan Wilcox, ¶ II(A), Fla. State Univ. (Aug. 20, 2013).
77. Multiple-Year Vice President for University Athletics Contract with Raymond Anderson, ¶ 1,
Ariz. State Univ. (Feb. 5, 2014).
78. Central Michigan University Associate Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agreement with David Heeke, ¶ 3.0, Cent. Mich. Univ. (Nov. 21, 2013).
79. Executive Employment Agreement with Daniel J. Schumacher, ¶ 2.1, Chi. State Univ. (June 10,
2012).
80. Employment Agreement with Daniel Radakovich, Jr., ¶ 4.1, Clemson Univ. (Dec. 1, 2012).
81. Employment Contract with Josiah C. Hull, Jr., ¶ 2.1, Coll. of Charleston (Jan. 1, 2008).
82. Employment Agreement with Mark Sandy, ¶ 3.1, E. Ky. Univ. (May 30, 2005).
83. Administrative Employment Contract Eastern Washington University Director of Intercollegiate Athletics with William Chaves, Jr., ¶ II, E. Wash. Univ. (July 1, 2013).
84. Georgia State University Athletic Association, Inc. Director of Athletics Agreement with Cheryl
L. Levick, ¶ 1, Ga. State Univ. (Mar. 30, 2009).
85. Employment Agreement with Jeffrey K. Tingey, art. 2.1, Idaho State Univ. (July 1, 2011).
86. Indiana State University Employment Contract for Director of Intercollegiate Athletics with
Ronald Prettyman, ¶ 2.0, Ind. State Univ. (Mar. 11, 2011).
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John Currie

Kansas State University

July 2010 – June 2016 (6)87

Robert De Carolis

Oregon State University

July 2011 – June 2016 (5)88

Morgan J. Burke

Purdue University

July 2010 – June 2017 (7)89

Eric C. Hyman

Texas A&M University

Aug. 2012 – July 2017 (5)90

David A. Brandon

University of Michigan

Mar. 2010 – Mar. 2015 (5)91

Lawrence “Bubba”
Cunningham

University of North
Carolina – Chapel Hill

Nov. 2011 – June 2017 (5.5)92

Eugene D. Smith

Ohio State University

Apr. 2005 – Apr. 2012 (7)93

Mitchell Barnhart

University of Kentucky

July 2007 – June 2012 (5)94

Sheahon Zenger

University of Kansas

Feb. 2011 – June 2015 (4)95

Gregory Byrne

University of Arizona

July 2014 – May 2019 (5)96

Richard L. George

University of Colorado

Sept. 2013 – Aug. 2018 (5)97

Warde Manuel

University of
Connecticut

Mar. 2012 – June 2017 (5)98

87. Employment Agreement with John Currie, ¶ 1, Kan. State Univ. (July 1, 2010).
88. Employment Agreement and Notice of Appointment Director, Oregon State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics with Robert De Carolis, ¶ 1, Or. State Univ. (July 1, 2011).
89. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, ¶ I, Purdue
Univ. (July 1, 2010).
90. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, ¶ 1, Tex. A&M Univ. (Aug. 1, 2012).
91. University of Michigan Athletic Director Employment Agreement with David A. Brandon, ¶ 2,
Univ. of Mich. (Mar. 8, 2010).
92. Employment Agreement with Lawrence (Bubba) Cunningham, ¶ 1, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill
(Nov. 14, 2011).
93. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, ¶ 2.1, Ohio State Univ. (Apr. 15, 2005).
94. Employment Agreement with Mitchell Barnhart, ¶ 1, Univ. of Ky. (July 1, 2007).
95. Employment Agreement with Sheahon Zenger, ¶ 1, Univ. of Kan. (Jan. 1, 2011).
96. Multiple-Year Employment Contract for Vice President for Athletics and Director of Athletics
with Gregory Byrne, ¶ 1, Univ. of Ariz. (July 15, 2014).
97. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of Colorado, ¶ 1(a), Univ. of Colo. (Aug. 23, 2013).
98. University of Connecticut Director of Athletics Agreement with Warde Manuel, ¶ 2, Univ. of
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Aug. 2014 – Aug. 2019 (5)99

C. Athletic Directors’ Compensation
The best study done to date with respect to athletic directors’
compensation was undertaken by USA Today in an article posted on March 6,
2013, entitled Athletic Director Salary Database.100
The compensation packages will greatly differ for athletic directors
employed by Division I Football Bowl Subdivision FBS Power 5 conferences,
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision FBS Non-Power 5 conferences, and
Division I Champion (FCS Non-football playing schools). Although the study
reports compensation packages for 2013, the range of compensation is
indicative of the difference in pay based on the status of the university and the
conference in which the university participates.101 What follows are the top
twenty-five paid NCAA athletic directors pursuant to the 2013 USA Today
study:102
RK

SCHOOL

CONF

1

Vanderbilt

SEC

2

Louisville

Big East

3

Florida

4

ATHLETICS DIRECTORS

SCHOOL PAY

David Williams

$3,239,678

Tom Jurich

$1,401,915

SEC

Jeremy Foley

$1,233,250

Wisconsin

Big Ten

Barry Alvarez

$1,143,500

5

Nebraska

Big Ten

Shawn Eichorst

$1,123,000

6

Texas

Big 12

DeLoss Dodds

$1,107,391

7

Ohio State

Gene Smith

$1,099,030

Big Ten

Conn. (Mar. 19, 2012).
99. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Appointment Terms with Anne “Sandy” Barbour, Univ. of
Penn State (July 26, 2014).
100. Jodi Upton & Steve Berkowitz, Athletic Director Salary Database, USA TODAY (Mar. 6,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06/athletic-director-salary-databasemethodology/1968783/. In an email received on October 23, 2015, from Steve Berkowitz, USA Today
Sports Projects Reporter, he indicated that USA Today would be revisiting the Athletic Director Salary
Database during the summer or fall of 2016 if USA Today decides to go ahead with a revised study.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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8

Notre Dame

Big East

Jack Swarbrick

$1,026,942

9

Oklahoma

Big 12

Joe Castiglione

$1,000,000

10

Duke

ACC

Kevin White

$906,536

11

Arkansas

SEC

Jeff Long

$900,000

12

Michigan

Big Ten

Dave Brandon

$900,000

13

Iowa State

Big 12

Jamie Pollard

$900,000

14

Tennessee

SEC

Dave Hart Jr.

$817,250

15

Texas A&M

SEC

Eric Hyman

$800,000

16

LSU

SEC

Joe Alleva

$725,000

17

Clemson

ACC

Dan Radakovich

$725,000

18

UCLA

PAC-12

Dan Guerrero

$715,211

19

Michigan State

Big Ten

Mark Hollis

$700,000

20

Texas Christian

Mt. West

Chris Del Conte

$695,769

21

Wake Forest

ACC

Ron Wellman

$688,000

22

South Carolina

SEC

Ray Tanner

$675,000

23

Missouri

SEC

Mike Alden

$651,917

24

Kentucky

SEC

Mitch Barnhart

$650,000

25

Navy

Patriot

Chet Gladchuk

$637,897

By way of comparison, what follows are the compensation packages for
athletic directors listed as the 50th through 69th highest paid athletic directors
in the 2013 USA Today study:103
50

South Florida

Big East

Doug Woolard

$479,657

51

Iowa

Big Ten

Gary Barta

$487,842

52

Purdue

Big Ten

Morgan Burke

$464,437

53

Washington State

PAC-12

Bill Moos

$455,000

103. See id.
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54

Connecticut

Big East

Warde Manuel

$450,000

55

Utah

PAC-12

Chris Hill

$450,000

56

Kansas

Sheahon Zenger

$450,000

57

Mississippi State

Scott Stricklin

$182,000

58

Florida International

Sun Belt

Pete Garcia

$441,832

59

Indiana

Big Ten

Fred Glass

$430,746

60

New Mexico

Mt. West

Paul Krebs

$408,391

61

Rutgers

Big East

Tim Pernetti

$410,000

62

Memphis

CUSA

Tom Bowen

$400,000

63

Mississippi

SEC

Ross Bjork

$400,000

64

Penn State

Big Ten

David Joyner

$396,000

65

Central Florida

CUSA

Todd Stansbury

$375,000

66

Arizona State

PAC-12

Stephen Patterson

$365,000

67

Cincinnati

Big East

Whit Babcock

$364,000

68

East Carolina

CUSA

Terry Holland

$361,400

69

Utah State

WAC

Scott Barnes

$350,108

Big 12
SEC

Finally, what follows are the compensation packages for athletic directors
listed as numbers 90th through 113th highest paid athletic directors in the 2013
USA Today study: 104
90

New Mexico State

91

Wyoming

92

Florida Atlantic

104. See id.

WAC

McKinley Boston

$239,128

Mt. West

Tom Burman

$236,004

Sun Belt

Patrick Chun

$235,000
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93

Akron

MAC

Tom Wistrcill

$229,500

94

Army

Patriot

Boo Corrigan

$233,500

95

Texas State

WAC

Larry Teis

$225,000

96

Miami (Ohio)

MAC

David Sayler

$220,000

97

Central Michigan

MAC

Dave Heeke

$219,838

98

Texas-San Antonio

WAC

Lynn Hickey

$215,000

Sun Belt

Chris Massaro

$210,215

Sun Belt

John Hartwell

$210,000

99

Middle Tennessee
State

100

Troy

101

Toledo

MAC

Mike O'Brien

$208,855

102

Massachusetts

A-10

John McCutcheon

$207,442

103

Eastern Michigan

MAC

Derrick Gragg

$200,011

104

Southern Mississippi

CUSA

Jeff Hammond

$200,000

105

South Alabama

Sun Belt

Joel Erdmann

$197,825

106

Arkansas State

Sun Belt

Terry Mohajir

$190,000

107

Idaho

Rob Spear

$189,866

108

Western Kentucky

Todd Stewart

$186,012

109

Bowling Green

MAC

Greg Christopher

$185,402

110

Western Michigan

MAC

Kathy Beauregard

$171,458

111

Air Force

Mt. West

Hans Mueh

$165,300

112

Louisiana-Lafayette

Sun Belt

Scott Farmer

$150,000

113

Louisiana-Monroe

Sun Belt

Bobby Staub

$109,923

WAC
Sun Belt

Not surprisingly, the median salary for athletic directors at universities that
are part of what are referred to as the BCS schools (i.e., members of the ACC,
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Big Ten, Big East, SEC, Big 12, and Pac 12) is more than two and a half times
larger than their non-BCS counterparts.105 In fact, the highest paid non-BCS
athletic director still earns less than the average salary among BCS athletic
directors according to the 2013 USA Today study.106
D.

Bonuses

Much like college coaches’ contracts, athletic director contracts are
designed to encourage and incentivize achievement. In reviewing numerous
athletic director contracts, bonuses are awarded for






105. See id.
106. See id.

Academics:
o Graduation rate
o Number of students on honor roll
o Grade Point Average (GPA)
o GPA compared against the conference
o GPA increase from previous year
o Percentage of scholar athletes
o Academic Progress Rate (APR)
Athletics:
o Percent of coach’s incentives
o Winning division
o Winning conference
o Achievement of top seed in conference tournament
o Participation in conference championship
o Achievement of conference championship game
o Appearance in postseason
o Advancement in postseason
o Appearance in title game
o Winning title game
o Directors’ cup ranking
o Win percentage
Financial:
o Revenue increase over previous year
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o Fiscal management
o Club membership growth
o Amount of contributions to the program
o Meeting fund raising objectives
Longevity and Retention
Signing bonuses
Overall performance bonus
Compliance bonus
Attendance bonus
Project completion

What follows are some examples of the bonus clauses itemized above:

1. Academic
University of Louisville – Thomas M. Jurich
(d)The following bonus based on the graduation rate of the
University student athletes which shall be non-cumulative:
i. $12,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than
60%, or
ii. $24,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than
65%, or
iii. $36,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than
70%, or
iv. $48,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than
75%.
(e)$20,000 for the Employer’s being a member of among the
Big East public universities, with the highest average GPA for
the academic year for all student athletes in conference sports
or for the Employer’s being the member among the Big East
public universities with the highest GPA for the academic year
for all student athletes in Division I-A football playing Big East

GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

766

7/26/2016 4:50 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

member schools;
(f)$15,000 for an Institutional Student Athlete average GPA of
3.0 for all University student athletes and conference sports;
(g)$1,000 per team GPA of 3.0 for student-athletes for an
academic year;
(h)An annual bonus in an amount equal to one hundred sixty
percent (160%) of the annual premium to be paid on the
insurance policy described in Section 4.7.107
University of Arizona – Gregory Byrne
A. Academic Performance
Director may receive additional compensation following
completion of a particular Academic Year for promoting
academic success by the University’s student-athletes as
measured by the following Student-Athlete Graduation Success
Rate (“SAGSR”) and Student-Athlete Cumulative Grade Point
Average (“SACGPA”) achievements, as defined and calculated
by University or NCAA rules. “Academic Year” shall mean
each respective twelve consecutive-month period beginning
each August on the first day of classes at the University.
SAGSR and SACGPA payments are for the highest ranked
achievement in each category and are not cumulative in either
category unless otherwise specified:
1.SAGSR
Director will receive the Additional Compensation
specified below if the SAGSR exceeds the General
University Graduation Success Rate (GUGSR) as follows
(no rounding off):
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 5%: 1 week of Base Salary
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 10%: 2 weeks of Base Salary

107. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, ¶ 3.2(d)–(g), Univ. of Louisville (Oct. 1, 2007).
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SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 15%: 3 weeks of Base Salary
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 20%: 4 weeks of Base Salary
2.SACGPA (cumulative)
Director will receive the Additional Compensation
specified below if the SACGPA for male and female
student-athletes exceeds the CGPA of comparable
non-student-athletes enrolled in the University:
Male SACGPA exceeds the general
University male CGPA
(no rounding off):
2 weeks of Base Salary
and
Female SACGPA exceeds the
University female CGPA
(no rounding off):

2 weeks of Base Salary

If none of the SAGSR or SACGPA achievements set forth
above are satisfied in a given Academic Year, no amount
will be paid to Director for such year. In no event shall
Director receive more than eight weeks of Base Salary in
any given Academic Year for the academic performance
achievements listed above. Additional compensation
under this Section accrues and is payable only if Director
was employed by the University as Director for the entire
Academic Year in which the academic achievements were
accomplished.108

108. Multiple-Year Employment Contract for Vice President for Athletics and Director of Athletics
with Gregory Byrne, supra note 96, ¶ III(A).
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University of Colorado – Richard L. George
5. Incentive Salary for Meeting Performance Goals. In
addition to his Base Salary and Supplemental Salary, George
may earn incentive compensation for meeting performance
goals (“Incentive Salary for Performance”) as set forth below.
George may earn Incentive Salary for Performance for reaching
a goal only if he has met or exceeded the goal on or before the
end of the period specified for meeting the goal.
(a) Academic Goals: In each Contract Year, George may
earn Incentive Salary for Performance as follows:
(i)

(ii)

Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) for each UCB
varsity team that scores an academic progress
rate (“APR”), as defined in NCAA legislation,
of One Thousand (1000) for the current
academic year as of the end of the UCB Spring
Semester of the Contract Year.
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the
average grade point average for all varsity
student athletes equals or exceeds the average
grade point average for all UCB undergraduate
students. The average grade point averages
shall be determined by the UCB Registrar as
of the end of the UCB Spring Semester of the
Contract Year.109

2. Athletic
University of Alabama – William R. Battle, III
“Wins BCS National Championship

$50,000

Wins SEC Championship Game

$40,000

109. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of
Colorado, supra note 97, ¶ 5(a).
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$20,000”110

Texas A&M University – Eric C Hyman
(a)Football
Win National Championship

$100,000;

Appearance in a [sic] NCAA sanctioned
post-season bowl other than the Cotton Bowl,
Chick-fil-A Bowl, Capital One Bowl, or the
Outback Bowl (inclusive of any successors
thereto that is not a Bowl Championship
Series (“BCS”) Bowl game

$30,000;

Appearance in the Cotton Bowl,
Chick-fil-A Bowl, Capital One Bowl,
or the Outback Bowl (inclusive of any
successors thereto)

$60,000;

Appearance in Conference
Championship Game

$60,000;

Appearance in BCS Bowl (or replacement
such as a Playoff Bowl Game) or
Championship Bowl (SEC v. Big 12)

$90,000.

(b)Men’s Basketball
CONFERENCE Regular Season or

110. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art. 4.05(a)(1)(i).
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Tournament Champion

$25,000;

Appearance NCAA Tournament

$25,000;

Appearance Sweet Sixteen

$50,000;

Appearance Final Four

$75,000;

National Champion

$100,000.

(c)Women’s Basketball
CONFERENCE Regular Season or
Tournament Champion

$25,000;

Appearance NCAA Tournament

$25,000;

Appearance Sweet Sixteen

$50,000;

Appearance Final Four

$75,000;

National Champion

$100,000.

(d)Other NCAA or CONFERENCE Sports
CONFERENCE Regular Season or
Tournament Champion

$10,000;

Team National Champion

$25,000;

Appearance NCAA Post Season
Competition or any individual

[Vol. 26:2
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$5,000.111

3. Financial Success
University of Illinois – Michael J. Thomas
Fundraising/Public Relations
 10% increase over previous
years I-Fund annual gifts (annual
fund, endowment, capital, other)
$20,000
 25% increase over previous
years I-fund annual gifts
$32,500
 $50M or greater in pledges/gifts
for Assembly Hall project
$25,000
 50-75 public speaking engagements
$10,000
 More than 75 public speaking
engagements
$10,000
 Excluding press-conferences and pre-game
appearances at campuses of University sponsored
receptions.
A multimedia clause will be added to this section for FY
2012-2013.
Maximum cumulative payment
for Fundraising/Public Relations

$60,000112

University of Maryland – Kevin Anderson
7.4 Beginning with the Year July 1, 2010 - June 30, 2011, a
payment of Seven ThousandFive Hundred Dollars ($7,500) at
the end of each Year the Terrapin Club membershipshas

111. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.03(a)–(d).
112. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, supra note 58, Ex. A.
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exceeded the previous year’s total by five percent (5%).
7.5 Beginning with the Year July 1, 2010 - 2011, a payment of
Seven Thousand FiveHundred Dollars ($7,500) at the end of
each Year that the total contributions made for thebenefit of
the Intercollegiate Athletic Program (including donations to the
University of Maryland, the University of Maryland College
Park Foundation, the University of Maryland Educational
Foundation, and the Terrapin Club) exceeds by five percent
(5%) the total of such contributions made in the prior Year.
The sum of contributions for the Year will be governed by
CASE accounting standards as interpreted by the University of
Maryland College Park Foundation.113
University of Colorado – Richard L. George
5. Incentive Salary for Meeting Performance Goals. In
addition to his Base Salary and Supplemental Salary, George
may earn incentive compensation for meeting performance
goals (“Incentive Salary for Performance”) as set forth below.
George may earn Incentive Salary for Performance for reaching
a goal only if he has met or exceeded to goal on or before the
end of the period specified for meeting the goal.
....
(b) Fundraising Goals: George may earn Incentive Salary for
Performance for meeting fundraising goals as follows.
“Fundraising” as used in this section means gifts and donations
designated or earmarked for the Athletics Departments (as
determined by the UCB Vice Chancellor for Advancement) and
booked after the effective date of this Agreement and before the
end of each specified period.
(i)

Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for Fundraising as
total of Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000) on

113. University of Maryland Athletic Director Agreement with Kevin Anderson, supra note 57, ¶¶
7.4–7.5.
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(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

or before June 30, 2014.
Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for Fundraising a
total of Twenty-five Million Dollars ($25,000,000)
on or before June 30, 2015.
Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) for Fundraising
a total of Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000) on or
before June 30, 2016.
Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($200,000) for Fundraising a
total
of
Seventy-five
Million
Dollars
($75,000,000) on or before June 30, 2017.
Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for Fundraising
a total of One Hundred Million Dollars
($100,000,000) on or before June 30, 2018.

(c) License and Sponsorship Revenue Goals: George may earn
Incentive Salary for Performance for Generating Licensing and
Sponsorship Revenue as follows. For purposes of this section
“Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue” means net revenue
received by UCB from licensing of University trademarks and
sponsorships, including, but not limited to, net revenue
received from the Collegiate Licensing Company[,] the Nike
Sponsorship Agreement, and Learfield Sports (or the successor
or assign of any of them) as of June 30th of each Contract Year.
“Fiscal Year 2013” means the State of Colorado fiscal year
which began July 1, 2012 and ended June 30, 2013.
(i)

(ii)

Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for generating
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the first
Contract Year of at least 1.5 times the amount of
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year
2013.
Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for generating
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the second

773
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Contract Year of at least 2 times the amount of
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year
2013.
Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) for generating
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the third
Contract Year of at least 3 times the amount of
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year
2013.
Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($200,000) [sic] for
generating Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in
the fourth Contract Year of at least 4 times the
amount of Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in
Fiscal Year 2013.
Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for generating
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the fifth
Contract Year of at least 5 times the amount of
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year
2013.

(d) Attendance Goals: In each Contract Year, George may earn
Incentive Salary for Performance in connection with
Attendance at games as follows. For purposes of this section,
“Attendance” means the paid game attendance, which includes
students, as determined by the UCB Athletics Department
Ticketing Office.
(i)

(ii)

Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average
Attendance at Folsom Stadium for regular season
football games for the Contract Year is at least
Fifty Thousand (50,000) individuals.
Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average
Attendance at the Coors Event Center for regular
season Men’s Basketball games for the Contract
Year is at least Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
(10,750) individuals.
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Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average
Attendance at the Coors Event Center for regular
season Women’s Basketball games for the
Contract Year increases at least 10% over the
previous Contract year.

The parties agree that any payment under this paragraph 5 is
expressly conditioned on George being employed as the
Athletic Director on the date the performance goal is achieved.
If, as of the date of the achievement of any performance goal,
George has been suspended pending the outcome of an
investigation by the University, the Conference, and/or the
NCAA, compensation under this paragraph 5 for achievement
of such goal shall not be due unless George is reinstated as the
Athletic Director. Incentive Salary for Performance under this
section shall be payable in a lump sum on or before sixty (60)
days after the achievement of the goal.114
4. Longevity or Retention Bonus
UCLA – Daniel G. Guerrero
If Director completes the five full years of service contemplated
under this contract, Director shall be paid a Retention Bonus of
$750,000 payable at the end of the fifth year of the contract.
None of this Retention Bonus shall vest or be payable if
Director does not complete such five full years of service
through March 31, 2013, except that if Director is terminated
by the University without cause prior to March 31, 2013, or in
the event of Director’s earlier death or a full disability that
prevents Director from performing under this Agreement,
Director or, in this case of Director’s death, Director’s heirs or
estate shall be paid $150,000 for each year of service completed
or pro-rated on a monthly basis for the actual number of months
of any such year of service that has been completed. The
payment of this bonus or pro-rated bonus is to be made not later

114. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of
Colorado, supra note 97, ¶ 5(b)–(c).
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than April 30, 2013 or within 60 days of the death or a
determination of full disability of Director if such death or
disability should occur earlier than April 1, 2013.115
Iowa State University – Jamie Pollard
If Pollard is still employed by University on June 30, 2018,
Pollard will receive a retention payment of $500,000, payable
on June 31, 2018. Said payment is forfeited by Pollard if
Pollard voluntarily leaves employment with Iowa State
University or is terminated with cause, as provided by Section
IV, prior to June 30, 2018. If Pollard is terminated by the
University without cause prior to June 30, 2018, Pollard shall
receive entire payment of $500,000 on July 31, 2018.116

University of Purdue – Morgan J. Burke
V. RETENTION BONUS
To incent Burke to remain at Purdue in his role as Director until
such time as he is slated to retire Purdue will pay Burke a
Retention Bonus if Burke remains employed as Director by
Purdue according to the following schedule:
1. If Burke remains employed as Director through June
30, 2012, Purdue will pay Burke a Retention Bonus of
$100,000.00 on that date;
2. If Burke remains employed as Director through June
30, 2015, Purdue will pay Burke a Retention Bonus of
$150,000.00 on that date; and

115. Employment Agreement UCLA Athletic Director with Daniel G. Guerrero, ¶ D(5), Univ. of
Cal. L.A. (Apr. 1, 2008).
116. Amended and Restated Employment Agreement with Jamie Pollard, ¶ V(2), Iowa State Univ.
(Sept. 1, 2012).
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3. If Burke remains employed as Purdue’s Director
through June 30, 2017, Purdue will pay Burke a
Retention Bonus of $100,000.00 on that date.117
Pennsylvania State University – Sandy Barbour

“Retention Bonus

$100,000 per contract year if AD
remains employed as athletic
director on the last day of
such contract year.”118

5. Signing or Extension Bonus
Boise State University – Mark Coyle ($75,000)
“In addition to the Base Salary, the University shall make a
one-time payment to Athletic Director in the amount of
$75,000 . . . .”119
6. Compliance Bonus
University of Iowa – Gary Barta ($15,000)
“Exemplary compliance with NCAA,
Big Ten and University Rules governing
athletics operations

$5,000.”120

117. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, supra note
89, ¶ V.
118. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Appointment Terms with Anne “Sandy” Barbour, supra
note 99.
119. Employment Agreement with Mark Coyle, supra note 60, art. 3.1.6.
120. The University of Iowa Amendment to Contract Director of Intercollegiate Athletics with Gary
Barta, ¶ 4, b.(3), Univ. of Iowa (Nov. 18, 2013).
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7. Attendance Bonus
Florida International University – Pedro A. Garcia
Attendance for Football Games:
i.
ii.
iii.

“Two percent (2%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance between 15,000 and 15,499; or
Five percent (5%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance between 15,500 and 15,999; or
Ten percent (10%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance 16,000or [sic] above.”

Attendance for Men’s Basketball Games:
i.
ii.
iii.

“Two percent (2%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance between 1,000and [sic] 1,999; or
Five percent (5%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance between 2,000and2,999 [sic]; or
Ten percent (10%) of base salary for average regular
season attendance 3,000 or above.”121
E.

Perquisites

Much like college coaches’ contracts, athletic directors are given benefits
and perquisites that come with the job. In summary, an athletic director’s
benefits and perquisites entail





Automobile
Country Club Memberships
Tickets
Media/Promotions/Public Relations Compensation

121. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, supra note 61,
¶ IX(b)(i)(5)a–b.
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Leave/Sick/Vacation Days
Spouse and Family Travel
Private Aircraft
Moving Expenses
Apparel
Housing
Travel
Temporary Housing
Term Life Insurance
Supplemental Pay
Golf Privileges
Course Fee Courtesy (Tuition)
Medical Physical Examination
Appointment as Professor
Entertainment Reimbursement
Financial Planning Reimbursement
Expense Account
Telephone

What follows are some examples of perquisites clauses in athletic directors’
contracts:
1. Automobile
University of Nebraska – Shawn M. Eichorst
“A monthly allowance of the $800 per month in lieu of any
benefit that might otherwise be included in this Contract related
to the provision of an automobile for Mr. Eichorst’s personal
use.”122

122. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 4(a)(1).
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University of Utah – Chris Hill
The University, at its sole expense, shall provide to HILL for
his use during the Term of this Agreement an automobile that
is mutually acceptable to the Parties for use by HILL. The
University shall pay for insurance for this automobile. The
University shall reimburse HILL for gasoline for expenses. To
obtain and retain this benefit, HILL must maintain a current and
valid Utah driver’s license.123
North Carolina State University – Deborah A. Yow
D.NC STATE shall make arrangements for and provide one (1)
courtesy or leased vehicle for the ATHLETICS DIRECTOR to
use, contingent upon and while performing her duties under this
Agreement. NC STATE shall be responsible for maintaining
collision and comprehensive liability insurance on the vehicle.
Alternatively, NC STATE may provide an annual automobile
allowance in the amount of $7,500. ATHLETICS DIRECTOR
shall be responsible for providing maintenance on any
vehicle.124
2. Country Club Memberships
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith
Ohio State shall
[p]rovide to the Director, while the Director is employed as the
Director of Athletics, a full family membership at a mutually
agreed-upon local country club, a social family membership at
a mutually agreed-upon local country club, and a full
membership at the University Faculty Club; however, personal
expenses associated with such country club memberships will

123. Employment Agreement with Chris Hill, ¶ 6(B), Univ. of Utah (July 1, 2011).
124. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with Deborah A. Yow, ¶ IV, D., N.C. State Univ.
(July 15, 2010).
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be paid by the Director.125
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis
The University will reimburse the Athletic Director for dues in
one (1) country club selected by the Athletic Director (which
does not engage in discriminatory practices in violation of
applicable federal and state laws), which membership is
required for the conduct of development activities and
entertainment associated with the Athletic Director’s official
responsibilities.126
University of Kentucky – Mitchell Barnhart
The University will continue to provide or make arrangements
for membership and initiation fees, if any, at a mutually agreed
upon golf or country club. AD shall be responsible for payment
of all expenses and costs associated with using the membership
excluding monthly dues, which shall be paid by University.127
3. Tickets
University of Kansas – Sheahon Zenger
g. Season Tickets. Athletics Director shall receive six season
tickets to men’s and women’s basketball games in Allen Field
House and to home football games in Memorial Stadium. Two
tickets for each sport shall be for business use by Athletics
Director in his capacity as Director of Intercollegiate Athletics,
and four tickets for each sport shall be considered
compensation to Athletics Director. For the 2010–2011 men’s
basketball season only, such tickets to men’s basketball games
shall be limited to four tickets to games remaining at the time
Athletics Director assumes duties, and shall consist of two

125. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.8(c).
126. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement
with Mark Hollis, § 4.2, Mich. State Univ. (June 1, 2012).
127. Employment Agreement with Mitchell Barnhart, supra note 94, ¶ 6(d).
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tickets for business use and two tickets for personal use.
h. Scholarship Suite in Memorial Stadium. Athletics Director
shall have the use for business purposes only, consistent with
IRS law and regulations, of a scholarship suite in the Kansas
Memorial Football Stadium during home football games. Such
use must include a clearly established business purpose, and in
any event at least 50 percent of attendees/occupants of the suite
must be present for official business purposes.128
Florida International University – Pedro A. Garcia
Garcia shall receive, without charge, twenty (20) tickets to
every home football and men’s and women’s basketball games,
five (5) tickets to every football and men’s and women’s
basketball away games, and ten (10) post season tickets to
football and men’s and women’s basketball games for business
use. In addition, Garcia shall be entitled to official team
transportation for up to five (5) people for away football
games.129
4. Housing Allowance
University of Purdue – Morgan J. Burke
“Effective July 1, 2010 and for the period that Burke is
Director, Purdue will provide Burke with a housing allowance
of $24,257.00, payable in 12 monthly installments. The
housing allowance shall be adjusted on an annual basis for cost
of living as determined by the Consumer Price Index.”130

128. Employment Agreement with Sheahon Zenger, supra note 95, ¶ 3(j)—(k).
129. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, supra note 61,
¶ IX, a.
130. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, supra note
89, ¶ IV(E).
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Eastern Carolina University – Jeffrey Compher
UNIVERSITY shall make temporary housing available for
ATHLETICS DIRECTOR for a period of up to six months
from the effective date of this Agreement. At UNIVERSITY’S
election and with reasonable notice to ATHLETICS
DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY may in its sole discretion, choose
to pay ATHLETICS DIRECTOR a housing allowance not to
exceed $1,500 per month instead of making housing directly
available to him.131
University of Connecticut – Warde Manuel
3.4 Housing Advance. Rather than provide for the accrual
of deferred compensation by MANUEL for the period
from the Effective Date through March 18, 2014 as
contemplated by the parties in the Offer and Letter
Agreement dated February 11, 2012, within thirty (30)
days of the execution of this Agreement by the
University and MANUEL, the University will pay to
MANUEL the sum of Two Hundred Thousand and
00/100 Dollars ($200,000) as an advance to assist
MANUEL in connection with the acquisition of a
personal residence in, or within a 50 mile vicinity of,
Storrs, Connecticut (“Housing Advance”). It is
acknowledged by the University and MANUEL that
the Housing Advance is being paid on the mutual
expectation of MANUEL and the University that
MANUEL will complete the Initial Term and,
therefore, if MANUEL does not complete the Initial
Term, MANUEL has agreed to repay all or a portion of
the Housing Advance (and potentially additional
amounts), subject to and in accordance with the terms
and conditions of Section 10.132

131. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, supra note 62, ¶ IV(C).
132. University of Connecticut Director of Athletics Agreement with Warde Manuel, supra note 98,
¶ 3.4.
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5. Spouse and Family Travel
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith
Ohio State shall “[p]rovide for the travel costs of the Director’s
spouse in attending away athletic contests. In no event shall
such travel costs exceed $5,000 in any contract year.”133
University of Michigan – David Brandon (Terminated)
For Bowl games, Men’s Basketball Final Four and other
significant sports events, the University shall pay for or
reimburse the Director for the reasonable travel expenses of his
spouse. Four other games and events, the University shall
cover the travel expenses of the Director’s spouse if there is no
significant incremental costs to the University. If commercial
carriers are used for travel not in the context of NCAA business
travel or significant athletic events, the Director shall be
responsible for his spouse’s travel expenses. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the Director shall be responsible for all taxes on
imputed income that he and/or his spouse may incur from travel
described herein.134
Texas A&M University – Eric C. Hyman
It is understood by the parties that from time to time HYMAN’s
spouse may be called upon to travel to and/or attend various
functions on behalf of UNIVERSITY. When engaged in such
activities, HYMAN’s spouse shall be entitled to payment for
travel and other expenses incurred in such official activities.135

133. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.6(b).
134. University of Michigan Athletic Director Employment Agreement with David A. Brandon,
supra note 91, Ex. B, 4.
135. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.04.
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6. Moving Expenses
Eastern Carolina University – Jeffrey Compher
“UNIVERSITY shall reimburse ATHLETICS DIRECTOR for
documented personal moving expenses of up to $18,000
reasonably incurred by ATHLETICS DIRECTOR within
twelve months of the effective date of this Agreement, in
accordance with standard procedures and applicable policies of
the UNIVERSITY.”136
Eastern Michigan University – Heather Lyke
Upon submission of appropriate invoices, the University shall
pay Employee’s moving company the standard costs associated
with her moving from her current residence to the Ypsilanti,
Michigan area. University’s payment shall include packing and
unpacking fees. The moving company must be selected based
on two competitive bids. Preapproval from the University must
be obtained before the moving company is hired.137
Texas A&M University – Eric C. Hyman
“HYMAN shall be reimbursed by UNIVERSITY up to an
amount not to exceed $50,000, upon presentation of
appropriate documentation and in accordance with
UNIVERSITY policy and procedure, for reasonable and
customary [out-of-pocket] expenses, including packing and
unpacking charges, incurred by HYMAN in moving to College
Station, Texas.”138

136. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, supra note 62, ¶ IV(B).
137. Eastern Michigan University Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agreement with
Heather Lyke, supra note 63, ¶ 3.1.20.
138. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.06.
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7. Private Aircraft
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith
Ohio State agrees to fly the Director by private (not
commercial) aircraft for business purposes only, not to exceed
fifteen (15) hours each contract year during the term of the
agreement. Each hour the aircraft is contracted for such use,
including but not limited to, empty “deadhead” legs of the
flight, will count toward the fifteen (15) hours per year (except
Ohio State shall only count the “deadhead” hours if Ohio State
is charged for such “deadhead” hours).139
University of Alabama – William R Battle, III
As additional compensation to Employee, upon reasonable
advance notice, the University shall furnish or otherwise make
available to Employee a non-commercial airline airplane for
Employees’ personal, non-business travel for a maximum of
twenty-five (25) hours of flight time per Contract Year. Flight
time, for purposes of the 25 hour maximum, shall not include
return trips without Employee, members of Employee’s family,
or guests of Employee aboard the aircraft in conjunction with
Employee’s use of the aircraft for personal, non-business
travel. Flight time not used in a Contract Year may not be
carried over for use in the next Contract Year.140
8.

Leave/Sick/Vacation Days

University of California – Anne Barbour
“Director shall be entitled to vacation leave as set forth in the
Contract Addendum. The leave shall be taken at a time or times
approved by the Associate Chancellor - Chief of Staff and the
Chancellor.”141

139. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.7.
140. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art IV, § 4.05(j).
141. Director Personnel Policies for Staff Members Employment Contract with Anne “Sandy” Barbour, ¶ 5(b), Univ. of Cal. (Oct. 1, 2004).
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Director shall be entitled to 20 working days of vacation leave
at the beginning of each contract year of this Employment
Contract. Director’s accrued vacation balance may not exceed
40 working days at any time during the period of this
Employment Contract. If Director’s accrued vacation balance
reaches 40 working days, Director will not be entitled to accrue
additional vacation leave under this provision until the leave
balance is reduced below 40 working days.142
“Director shall be entitled to sick leave for absences due to
illness as set forth in the Contract Addendum. In addition, the
Associate Chancellor – Chief of Staff and the Chancellor may
grant leave to Director with or without pay for other reasons,
including illness.”143
“Director shall be entitled to use up to 12 days of sick leave
during each contract year of this Employment Contract.”144
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich
“The employee will receive one-month annual leave with pay
and medical and administrative leave with pay on the same
basis as other University administrators.”145
9. Life Insurance
University of Kentucky – Mitchell Barnhart
“In addition to any amounts of life insurance provided through
the University’s standard benefit package, University agrees to
continue to provide AD with an additional term life insurance
policy in the amount of One Million Dollars

142. Id. at Cont. Add. ¶ 3.
143. Id. ¶ 5(c).
144. Id. at Cont. Add. ¶ 4.
145. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, supra note 107, ¶ 4.8.
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($1,000,000.00).”146
South Carolina University – Donald Ray Tanner, Jr.
“During the term of this Employment Agreement, the
University shall pay the premiums necessary to provide
Employee with term life insurance benefits totaling Five
Hundred Thousand ($500,000) Dollars. Employee shall have
the sole and exclusive right to designate any beneficiary.”147
Georgia Technical University – Michael A. Bobinski
“Bobinski shall be provided, at no charge, the PPO family
medical insurance, dental and life insurance (up to three times
the value of the annual salary amount up to a maximum of one
million dollars) normally made available to employees of the
Institute.”148
University of Illinois – Michael Thomas
“The University will reimburse Thomas on an annual basis for
the premium cost of term life insurance with a death benefit of
$1,000,000.00 upon presentation of billings for purchase of
such insurance by Thomas, up to a maximum cost of $100.00
per month ($1,200.00 per year).”149
10. Miscellaneous
a. Course fee courtesy (Tuition)
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis
“The Athletic Director shall be eligible for course fee courtesy

146. Employment Agreementwith Mitchell Barnhart, supra note 94, ¶ 6(e).
147. Employment Agreement with Donald Ray Tanner, Jr., supra note 69, ¶ 4.04.
148. Employment Contract with Michael A. Bobinski, supra note 70, art. IV(A).
149. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, supra note 58, ¶ 4(h).
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credit for the Athletic Director’s spouse and children, as
described in and subject to the University’s Course Fee
Courtesy Policy.”150
b. Medical Physical Examination
UCLA – Daniel G. Guerrero
By exception to policy, Director shall be eligible for a
comprehensive annual physical examination at a cost not to
exceed $3,500 per year to be paid by department recharge from
the Athletic Department to the UCLA School of Medicine’s
Comprehensive Health Program. Director’s participation in
this physical is entirely voluntary, University shall observe all
State and federal regulatory requirements concerning the
protection of Director’s health information, and the results of
such a physical shall not serve as a condition of employment.151
c. Appointment as Professor
University of Utah – Chris Hill
Upon resignation as the Athletics Director or termination
without cause, HILL shall be entitled to receive a tenure-track
faculty appointment in the College of Health, or such other
college
as
deemed
appropriate
by
the
President . . . . Compensation for HILL’s faculty position shall
be commensurate with other similarly situated faculty members
in the College of Health and shall be determined by the
President in consultation with the Dean of the College of
Health. The faculty appointment will not be available to HILL
in the event he is terminated by the University for cause.152

150. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement
with Mark Hollis, supra note 126, § 3.7.
151. Employment Agreement UCLA Athletic Director with Daniel G. Guerrero, supra note 115, ¶
E(6).
152. Employment Agreement with Chris Hill, supra note 123, ¶ 6(D).
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d. Entertainment Reimbursement
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis
The University will reimburse the Athletic Director for
personal and spousal travel and out-of-pocket expenses the
Athletic Director reasonably incurs in the course of the
performance of duties under this Agreement. Expenses of
entertaining, including home entertaining as appropriate, may
be reimbursed through discretionary and other Department
funds. Reimbursements shall be made only pursuant to
University policies and procedures.153
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich
The Employee is encouraged and expected to incur reasonable
and necessary business and entertainment expenses consistent
with the responsibilities and duties of the Employees’ [sic]
position. All business related expenses shall be reimbursed
according to customary practice consistent with normal
business standards, the Association Travel and Expense Policy,
and consistent with the responsibilities and duties of the
Employee’s position.154
e. Financial Planning Reimbursement
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich
“The Employer agrees to reimburse Employee for reasonable
expenses associated with financial planning, not to exceed
$15,000 per annum.”155

153. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement
with Mark Hollis, supra note 126, § 4.1.
154. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, supra note 107, ¶ 5.3.
155. Id. ¶ 5.5.
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Expense Account

University of Florida – Jeremy Foley
In addition to normal reimbursement for business travel
pursuant to University regulations, Association agrees to
provide as part of his compensation as Athletic Director, a
personal expense account for Foley at the rate of $15,000.00
per annum net of applicable Federal and State withholding
taxes.156
University of Alabama – William R Battle, III
“The University shall arrange and provide for Employee
through supporting foundation of the University an expense
allowance in the amount of Twelve Thousand Dollars
($12,000) annually.”157
g. Telephone
Louisiana State University – Joe Alleva
Alleva will receive “[a]ppropriate mobile communications
device and service.”158

F.Termination
Athletic director contracts are similar to those of college coaches’
contracts in that they provide for different formats of termination, including
termination for cause, termination without cause, termination for death or
disability, and termination by an athletic director. For example purposes, the
Authors have used Stephen Patterson’s employment agreement with the
University of Texas at Austin, Julie Herman’s employment contract with
Rutgers State University of New Jersey, and Shawn Eichorst’s employment
contract with the University of Nebraska.

156. University of Florida Employment Contract Athletic Director with Jeremy N. Foley, supra note
66, ¶ 11.
157. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art. 4.05(c).
158. Employment Agreement with Joseph L. Alleva, supra note 67, ¶ 5(B).
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1. Termination for Cause
Stephen Patterson, University of Texas, November 25, 2013 (Terminated)
A. Suspension or Termination by the University for Cause.
The University shall have the right and option to either suspend
Athletics Director for a period of time with or without pay or to
terminate Athletics Director’s employment and this Agreement
for cause prior to the termination date stated in Section 3 above.
In the even this Agreement is terminated for cause, all
obligations of the University to make further payment or
provide any other consideration hereunder shall cease as of the
date of termination. In no case shall the University be liable to
Athletics Director for the loss of any collateral business
opportunities, or any benefits, perquisites, income, or
consequential damages suffered by Athletics Director as a
result of the University’s termination of his employment. In
addition to its normally understood meaning in employment
contracts, the term “cause” shall include, without limitation,
any of the following:
(1) Failure or refusal by Athletics Director to perform any
of the obligations, duties, or responsibilities outlined in
Section 4 or any refusal or unwillingness to perform any of
such obligations, duties, or responsibilities in good faith
and to the best of Athletics Director’s abilities; or
(2) A serious or major violation or a pattern of violations,
whether intentional or negligent, by Athletics Director of
any Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules, which
violation may, in the sole judgment and discretion of the
President, reflect adversely upon the University, or the
Program; or
(3) A serious or major violation or a pattern of violations
of any Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules,
whether intentional or negligent, or the allowing or
condoning, whether directly or by negligent supervision, of
any such violation or pattern of violations, by Athletics
Director or any coaching staff or other person under
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student-athletes in the Program, which violation was
known (or reasonably should have been known) by
Athletics Director in the course of his normal duties, and
which may, in the sole judgment and discretion of the
President, reflect adversely upon the University or the
Program; or
(4) Failure by Athletics Director to report immediately to
the athletics compliance staff and, as appropriate, to the
President or other responsible University officer, any
alleged violations of the Governing Athletic Rules or
University Rules by Athletics Director or by members of
Athletics Director’s coaching staffs, student-athletes, or
other persons under Athletics Director’s direct control or
authority that become known to Athletics Director; or
(5) Failure or refusal to provide information or documents
in response to any reasonable requests or inquires by the
NCAA, the Conference, or any other relevant governing
body concerning or related to the supervision of the
Program; or directing or otherwise instructing any coach,
student-athlete, or any other individual to fail or to refuse
to provide such information or documents; or
(6) Any fraud or dishonesty by Athletics Director while
performing the duties required by this Agreement,
including, but not limited to, falsifying, altering, or
otherwise fraudulently preparing any documents(s) or
record(s) of, or required by the University, the NCAA, or
the Conference pertaining to the Program, recruits, or
student-athletes, transcripts, eligibility forms, compliance
reports, expense reports, or any other document pertaining
or related to any sanction of the Program; or
(7) Any conduct, including acts or omissions, that misleads
the University about any matters related to the Program,
including matters related to any coaches or other staff
members or any student-athletes; or

793
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(8) Any prolonged absence from the performance of
Athletics Director’s obligations, duties, and responsibilities
under this Agreement without prior consent of the
President; or
(9) Engaging in, assisting, encouraging, or soliciting others
to engage in bookmaking, illegal gambling, or betting of
any type involving any intercollegiate or professional
athletic contest; or
(10) Possession, use, sale, or manufacture of any narcotics,
drugs, or other controlled substances, steroids, or other
chemicals in a manner that is prohibited by the University
Rules or Governing Athletic Rules, or allowing,
encouraging, or condoning the possession, use, sale, or
manufacture of any narcotics, drugs, alcohol, controlled
substances, steroids or other chemicals by any
student-athlete in a manner that is prohibited by the
University Rules or Governing Athletic Rules, or failure or
refusal to fully participate and cooperate in the University’s
implementation and enforcement of any narcotic, drug,
alcohol, controlled substance, steroid, or other chemical
testing program(s); or
(11) Any conduct (a) that the President reasonably
determines is unbecoming to the Athletics Director, or
which reasonably brings into question the integrity of the
Athletics Director, or that would render Athletics Director
unfit to serve in the position of Athletics Director; or (b)
resulting in a criminal charge being brought against
Athletics Director involving a felony or any crime
involving theft, dishonesty, or moral turpitude; or
(12) Misconduct by associate or assistant athletics directors
or other senior staff or by a coach or his or her staff of
which the Athletics Director knew, had reason to know, or
should have known through the exercise of reasonable
diligence or which Athletics Director condoned, of such a
nature, as reasonably determined in the discretion of the
President, that brings serious discredit to or hams the
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reputation of the University or the Program; or
(13) Any other cause adequate to sustain the termination of
any regular administrative and professional employee of
the University.
The University shall have no obligation to use progressive
discipline regarding Athletics Director’s misconduct. Any
University decision to utilize progressive discipline shall not
create any future obligation for the University to use
progressive discipline.159
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013
(Terminated)
XII.Discipline and Termination for Cause
A. If Hermann is found to have violated NCAA rules or
regulations, whether while employed by Rutgers or prior to
employment by Rutgers, or to have failed to report or failed to
take all reasonable means to prevent or stop a violation of
which she knew or knows or reasonably should have known,
she shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action,
including termination of employment or suspension without
pay for significant or repetitive violations.
B. The University may terminate Hermann for cause, or impose
other discipline for cause, for (i) material breach of this
Employment Contract; (ii) neglect of duty; (iii) willful
misconduct; (iv) act of moral turpitude; (v) disregard of duty to
take all reasonable actions to ensure all staff under your
supervision and student-athletes abide by Academic Integrity
policy; (vi) conduct tending to bring shame or disgrace to the
University, or otherwise detrimental to the University’s good
name and reputation as a public institution of higher education
respectful of individuals and the rule of law, as determined in

159. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 7(A).
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good faith by the President; (vii) violation of University
regulations, policies, procedures or directives not remedied
after thirty (30) days written notice to Hermann; (viii) violation
of your responsibilities related to the requirements and
standards referenced in Section X above and to cooperate with
any compliance effort or investigation; (ix) a criminal
conviction; or (x) unapproved absence from duty, other than for
a bona fide use of sick leave in accordance with University
policy, without the consent of the President.
C. Failure to impose disciplinary or corrective actions in any
particular instance of breach or violation, or with respect to any
particular conduct or incident, shall not act as a waiver of the
University’s right to later discipline or correct Hermann in
connection with any breach, violation, conduct or incident,
whether the same or different in degree or type, nor shall any
single or partial exercise of any right, power or privilege
preclude any further or other exercise thereof.
D. If the University terminates Hermann for cause, the
University shall not be liable for payment of salary or benefits
after the date of termination.160
2. Termination Without Cause
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013
(Terminated)
XIII.Termination Without Cause
The University may terminate Hermann without cause, as cause
is defined in Section XII above, as it deems necessary, in the
sole discretion and judgment of the University, to further the
best interests of the University. In such an event, the University
shall continue to pay Hermann her full base salary and health
and pension benefits, but no other amount or item, as of the date
of termination until the expiration date of this Employment

160. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, supra note 71, ¶ XII.
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Contract (including any extensions, if any) or the date on which
Hermann secures other employment, whichever date shall first
occur. Hermann shall notify Rutgers promptly of her securing
other employment. Hermann agrees to accept this payment of
full base salary and health and pension benefits in full
settlement of all claims and demands which may accrue to
Hermann under this Employment Contract and Rutgers shall
not be liable to Hermann for any other damage, loss or
amount.161

Shawn M. Eichorst, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 1, 2013
Section 13. Termination of Employment for Reasons Other
than for Cause; Liquidated Damages; Mitigation of Damages.
(a) The position of Athletic Director is unique and requires
special talents and skills. As such, it is the only position for
which Mr. Eichorst is being employed, and the University shall
not have the right to reassign Mr. Eichorst to any other position.
The parties agree that the University shall, at any time, have the
right to terminate Mr. Eichorst’s employment hereunder for
reasons other than for cause upon giving Mr. Eichorst
reasonable written or verbal notice of termination, as such
reasonableness, may be determined by the University in its
discretion and exercise of good faith. Notwithstanding any
Contract provision which might be interpreted to the contrary
or unless otherwise specifically agreed to in writing, Mr.
Eichorst’s employment relationship with the University as
Athletic Director shall terminate effective upon delivery of the
notice of termination or as otherwise set forth in the notice of
termination, in the event of such termination, the parties further
agree that the damages incurred by Mr. Eichorst would be
uncertain and not susceptible to exact computation.
Accordingly, it is understood and agreed that any and all claims
which may arise in Mr. Eichorst’s favor against the University
and its Board members, employees and agents by reason of
such termination shall be strictly and solely limited to an

161. Id. ¶ XIII.
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amount of liquidated damages to be determined by multiplying
the number of full months remaining in the Term immediately
prior to the termination (such period of time to be referred to
herein as the “LD Term”) by the amount of $81,083.83. Except
as otherwise set forth in this section below with respect to
mitigation, the liquidated damages shall be paid in equal
monthly installments over the course of the LD Term. In case
of Mr. Eichorst’s death, the University’s obligations under this
section 13 shall cease, effective on the last day of the month in
which Mr. Eichorst dies. The obligations of the University
under this subsection shall survive termination of this Contract.
(b) Mr. Eichorst herby acknowledges and agrees to accept the
duty to mitigate the liquidated damages described in this
section, as well as any other damages Mr. Eichorst may sustain
upon termination of this Contract, whether such termination be
one for cause or without cause. More specifically, within a
reasonably brief period following termination, Mr. Eichorst
shall use his best efforts to seek and secure substantially
comparable employment, including the customary and
reasonable terms and conditions of compensation at the new
employment, without structuring or timing compensation to
avoid mitigation. If Mr. Eichorst obtains other employment
during the LD Term, and such employment guarantees Mr.
Eichorst cash compensation of $973,000.00 or more, then the
monthly payments described in this section at (a) above shall
cease.
However, if Mr. Eichorst obtains such other
employment and the guaranteed cash compensation for the
employment is less than $973,000.00 per year, then all
University obligations to Mr. Eichorst for payments under this
section 13 shall cease upon payment of a lump sum to Mr.
Eichorst from the University, or other party designated by the
University,
computed as follows: the present value of a stream of payments
over the remaining LD Term in an amount equal to the
difference between $81,083.33 and Mr. Eichorst’s monthly
prorated amount of his annual gross cash salary at the new
employment, discounted at the 3-year Treasury Constant
Maturity Rate. [For purposes of illustration, assume Mr.
Eichorst secures employment following a termination without
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cause. Upon the commencement of his new employment,
fifteen months remain in the LD Term. Mr. Eichorst’s new
employment guarantees that he receives cash salary of
$600,000.00 a year (a monthly prorated amount of $50,000.00.)
The University’s obligations under this section would be
fulfilled upon payment to Mr. Eichorst of a lump sum equal to
the present value of a stream of fifteen monthly payments of
$31,083.83 ($81,083.33 less $50,000.00), discounted at the rate
stated above.]
(c) The parties have, bargained for and agreed to the foregoing
liquidated damages provisions, giving consideration to the fact
that Mr. Eichorst will lose certain benefits, supplemental
compensation or outside compensation related to employment
as Athletic Director, which damages are extremely difficult to
determine with certainty. The parties agree that payment to Mr.
Eichorst of the liquidated damages provided in subsections (a)
and/or (b) of this section shall constitute adequate and
reasonable compensation to Mr. Eichorst for the damages and
injury suffered by Mr. Eichorst as a result of the termination of
this Contract by University. Upon payment of such liquidated
damages to Mr. Eichorst, Mr. Eichorst does hereby waive and
release the University, its Board members, administrators,
employees and agents, from any and all claims of any nature
whatsoever, which may arise by reason of such termination,
including, but not limited to any benefits of employment or
other income which may accrue to Mr. Eichorst by reason of
Mr. Eichorst’s position as Athletic Director.
(d) Should the University, based upon advice of legal counsel
or for any other reason the University in its discretion deems is
appropriate, determine that the payments, provided for in this
section are to be paid from resources other than resources of the
State of Nebraska, then the University promises that it will
secure funds from non-public funds for the satisfaction of the
obligation described in this section.162

162. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 13.
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3. Termination for Death and Disability
Stephen Patterson, University of Texas, November 25, 2013 (Terminated)
D. Termination for Disability/Death. If Athletics Director
dies or becomes permanently disabled to the extent that, in the
judgment of the President, Athletics Director cannot
satisfactorily perform the duties of Athletics Director, this
Agreement shall terminate and all obligations of the University
to compensate Athletics Director pursuant to this Agreement
shall cease as of the date of such death or disability. The
University shall be obligated to compensate Athletics Director
or Athletics Director’s estate in accordance with this
Agreement for services performed prior to the termination date
and, Athletics Director or Athletics Director’s estate shall be
entitled to those benefits, if any, that are payable under any
University sponsored group employee insurance or benefit plan
in which Athletics Director is or was enrolled.163
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013
(Terminated)
XIV. Termination upon Death or Disability
This Employment Contract will terminate upon the death of
Hermann or upon her total and permanent disability. Total and
permanent disability shall mean physical or mental incapacity
of a nature which prevents Hermann, in the sole judgment of
Rutgers, from performing her duties under this Employment
Contract for a period of ninety (90) consecutive days. In case
of death or disability, as described above, death or disability
benefits contained in benefit plans in which Hermann
participates shall be paid to her personal representative or other
designated beneficiaries, or to Hermann, as the case may be.164

163. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 7(D).
164. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, supra note 71, ¶ XIV.
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4. Termination by an Athletic Director
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013
(Terminated)
XV. Termination by Hermann
Hermann may terminate this Employment Contract by
providing the University ninety (90) days advance written
notice to the President. In such event, Rutgers’ obligations
under this Employment Contract shall terminate upon the
effective date of termination. Upon receipt of such notice from
Hermann, Rutgers may, in its sole discretion, relieve Hermann
of her duties as Director of Intercollegiate Athletics at any time
after receiving such notice. In such event, Rutgers may, in its
reasonable discretion, which shall not be unreasonably
exercised, treat such termination as for cause and shall not be
liable for payment of salary or any benefits after the date it has
relieved Hermann of her duties.165
Shawn M. Eichorst, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 1, 2013
Section 9. Discussion of Other Prospective Employment;
Resignation.
...
(b) Except as more specifically described in this subsection (b),
there shall be no penalty to Mr. Eichorst for resignation from
employment pursuant to this Contract; provided however, in
the event that Mr. Eichorst resigns for any reason other than
pursuant to Section 9(c) prior to December 31, 2017 the parties
further agree that the damages incurred by the University would
be uncertain and not susceptible to exact computation.
Accordingly, it is understood and agreed that any and all claims
which may arise in the University’s favor against Mr. Eichorst
as a result of his resignation shall be strictly and solely limited
to liquidated damages in the following amounts which sum
shall be paid by Mr. Eichorst, or on his behalf, to Athletics

165. Id. ¶ XV.
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within sixty (60) days following the effective date of Mr.
Eichorst’s resignation:
Effective January 1
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Liquidated Damages
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
None

The parties have bargained for and agreed to the foregoing
liquidated damages provision, giving consideration to the
significant costs of conducting an employment search for an
Athletic Director; the serious and substantial disruption to
Athletics and the University; and the serious and substantial
devotion of administrative resources in relation to a change of
Athletics leadership; all these result in damages extremely
difficult to determine with certainty. The parties agree that
payment to the University of the liquidated damages provided
above shall constitute adequate and reasonable compensation
to the University for the damages and injury suffered by
University as a result of Mr. Eichorst’s departure.
(c) The parties have bargained for and agreed that there shall
be no liquidated damages under this section 9 in the event that
prior to December 31, 2017 the current UNL Chancellor
resigns or retires and Mr. Eichorst resigns within 90 days of
such resignation or retirement.166
IV. CHALLENGES MOVING FORWARD
As the overseer of an athletic enterprise, an athletic director is responsible
for upholding the best interests of a university’s athletic programs and its
student-athletes. This section discusses the challenges that athletic directors
currently face and may face in the future, possible outcomes or consequences,

166. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 9(b)–(c).
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and steps that other athletic directors have already taken to address certain
issues. In recent years, this balancing act has become more difficult as a result
of uncertainty in the legal landscape of college athletics. Athletic directors must
prepare for multifaceted challenges in key areas of college athletics, such as
amateurism, conference autonomy, budget management, and institutional
control. It is difficult to predict the consequences of ongoing legal battles and
future legislation; thus, a successful athletic director must be flexible and
adaptive and prepare for many possible outcomes.
A.

The Principle of Amateurism - Introduction

The Principle of Amateurism states that
[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated [primarily] by
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be
derived. Student participation in [intercollegiate] athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.167
The athletic director of today must be familiar with, understand, and know
how to apply rules and regulations to fulfill his or her duty of oversight and
compliance. These rules and regulations, such as amateurism, are what make
college athletics unique. From the viewpoint of an athletic director, amateurism
is what separates the athletic program from the corporate boardroom.
The concept of amateurism is constantly challenged. Recent developments
call into question the legal status of NCAA rules that seek to protect
amateurism. In O’Bannon v. NCAA, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that, although amateurism rules are likely procompetitive, the
NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.168 The court
held that by applying the Rule of Reason, one proper alternative to NCAA
compensation rules is to permit NCAA member universities to pay
student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance.169
Another challenge to the concept of amateurism was a decision made by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Region 13 Director who found that

167. 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2.9 (2015) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (emphasis
added).
168. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
169. Id.
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grant-in-aid scholarship football players at Northwestern University were
employees under section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act’s broad
definition of employee.170 However, this ruling was later overturned by the
NLRB, stating that it lacked jurisdiction regarding Northwestern University’s
grant-in-aid scholarship football players.171 Although the NLRB declined
jurisdiction, it did not preclude itself from reconsidering the issue in the
future.172 Thus, student-athlete amateurism reform is still possible in the labor
arena. Similarly, the court in O’Bannon allowed NCAA amateurism rules to be
subject to antitrust scrutiny.173 The athletic director of today must anticipate
these possible changes because they will affect the budget, revenues, expenses,
and the relationship between student-athletes and the university. Moreover,
planning ahead is beneficial because not all reform in college athletics depends
on prolonged litigation or judicial decisions as evidenced by those proactive
universities that voted to allow athletic scholarships to cover the full cost of
attendance.174
1. Athletic Scholarships
Before the approval of athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance,
student-athletes were actually able to receive financial aid in excess of an
athletic scholarship. All student-athletes could receive athletic scholarships
capped at the amount of “full ‘grant in aid.’”175 Full grant-in-aid consists of
“tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”176
Student-athletes could then request to receive financial aid beyond the amount
of full grant-in-aid by applying for additional funds through programs such as
the NCAA’s Division I Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund and need-based
federal Pell Grants.
Now, universities are allowed to award athletic scholarships that cover the
“full cost of attendance.”177 Full cost of attendance consists of all the items
included in full “grant in aid plus ‘[non-required] books and supplies,

170. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, *8 (. 2015).
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id.
173. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.
174. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships,
NCAA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schoolsadopt-cost-attendance-scholarships.
175. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.
176. Id.
177. Hosick, supra note 174.
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transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution.’”178
As of January 2015, student-athletes are able to receive, but are not entitled
to receive, the full cost of attendance as part of their athletic scholarships. 179
The difference between full grant-in-aid and full cost of attendance will be given
to student-athletes in the form of a stipend.180 Although this is a great benefit
to student-athletes, several burdens fall on athletic directors, their universities,
and their budgets.
One difficulty arising from paying the full cost of attendance for athletic
scholarships is that athletic directors must find ways to obtain the additional
amount of money needed to pay student-athletes, which can be difficult. Within
the Big 12 Conference, the additional full cost of attendance value per
student-athlete ranges from $2,700 to $5,100 per year.181 The average gap
across all FBS universities is about $3,500.182 The highest and lowest full cost
of attendance values among the Power 5 Conferences are $6,018 and $1,400,
respectively.183 Although this may not seem like much money compared to the
millions of dollars in revenue generated by athletic programs, the total sum of
money given to male and female student-athletes will noticeably drive up the
cost of doing business for each university. Only twenty FBS universities
actually made a profit from their athletic programs in 2013.184 Athletic
programs like the University of Texas might be able to afford to accommodate
an additional $5,750 per student-athlete, totaling approximately $1.5 million.185
Similarly, the Ohio State University Athletic Director Gene Smith already
worked $1.65 million into his budget to cover the full cost of attendance
scholarships.186 On the other hand, most athletic programs do not have the
discretionary funds or the luxury to simply reallocate the budget. At the

178. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 n.3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 184, art. 15.02.2.
179. Hosick, supra note 174.
180. See generally John Charles Bradbury & Joshua Pitts, Full Cost of Attendance Scholarships and
College Choice: Evidence from NCAA Football, KENNESAW STATE UNIV., 1 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656409.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id. at 4.
184. John Powers, Paying Stipends to College Athletes Remains a Divisive Issue, BOS. GLOBE (Sep.
2, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/09/01/paying-stipends-college-athletes-remainsdivisive-issue/eQV4hEW5A0wbTfw3S1KgKO/story.html.
185. Epstein, supra note 41.
186. Todd Jones, College Athletics | Ohio State’s Gene Smith Sees ‘Watershed Moment,’ BUCKEYE
XTRA SPORTS (May 31, 2015), http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/stories/2015/05/31/smithsees-watershed-moment.html.
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University of North Carolina, Athletic Director Bubba Cunningham has the
challenge of generating approximately $1.8 million in additional funds to cover
the full cost of attendance for all current student-athletes.187
Another difficulty that athletic directors face is that not all universities can
afford to pay the full cost of attendance to every student-athlete; however, they
must do so to compete with other universities in the recruitment of potential
student-athletes.188 Now, a new element, or luxury, that athletic directors must
compete with is the full cost of attendance stipend. The full cost of attendance
value differs from campus to campus, creating an opportunity for universities to
differentiate themselves in the eyes of recruits.189 North Carolina State
University Athletic Director Debbie Yow stated that a competitive advantage
could be gained when a recruit “counts up how much cash he could make by
going to school A versus school B.”190 Universities with higher cost of
attendance values can use it as an advantage. James Franklin, head football
coach at Penn State University, said that having one of the highest cost of
attendance values in the country is now something he can use in recruiting.191
Many other university athletic department officials suggest that full cost of
attendance values are being used as a recruiting tool.192
The NCAA requires that cost of attendance for student-athletes must be
calculated “in accordance with the cost-of-attendance policies and procedures
that are used for students in general.”193 Thus, cost of attendance is calculated
differently by each university’s financial aid office using federal regulations.194
The calculations are significant because they have an effect on all students, not
just student-athletes. Usually, universities are pressured to keep the cost of
attendance amount low in an attempt to limit borrowing by its students and also

187. Andrew Carter, An Interview with UNC Athletic Director Bubba Cunningham on Changes in
College Sports, the Reopening of an NCAA Investigation, Roy Williams Future and More, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/sports/college/football/article9158777.html.
188. Jay Drew, BYU Athletics Will Pay $4,500 for Cost of Attendance, Among Highest in Country,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 3, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/sports/2465529-155/byu-athletics-will-pay4500-for.
189. Hosick, supra note 174.
190. Eric Prisbell, What Is Full Cost of Attendance for NCAA Athletes?, USA TODAY (Aug. 17,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/17/ncaa-full-cost-of-attendance/14200387/.
191. Jake New, More Money . . . If You Can Play Ball, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/12/colleges-inflate-full-cost-attendance-numbers-increasing-stipends-athletes.
192. See Powers, supra note 184.
193. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 15.02.2.1.
194. Id. art. 15.02.2.
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to avoid deterring potential students as a result of high costs.195 However,
athletic directors and coaches may now want to be involved in the
decision-making to increase the full cost of attendance amount. Changes in the
full cost of attendance values of universities in the Power 5 Conferences should
be observed over the next few years to determine if, and by how much,
university financial aid departments adjust their numbers in the wake of the full
cost of attendance era. Failure to comply with financial aid regulations can
result in financial liabilities, fines against a university, limitations on a
university’s Title IV program participation, or even elimination of a university’s
eligibility to participate in one or more of the Title IV programs. 196 Simply
because universities are now allowed to award student-athletes scholarships up
to the full cost of attendance, does not mean that all universities will. Athletic
directors are faced with tough decisions if their universities cannot afford to
award every student-athlete a scholarship up to the full cost of attendance. For
some athletic directors, equality comes into play. Former Syracuse University
Athletic Director Mark Coyle thinks that full cost of attendance scholarships
should apply to all student-athletes because it is the “fair and right thing to
do.”197 For athletic directors who cannot easily obtain funds from the operating
budget or boosters, other means must be used to fund the new athletic
scholarships. One possibility is to cut costs by eliminating non-revenue
producing sports.198
Another difficult issue that athletic directors must balance if they pay full
cost of attendance scholarships is compliance with Title IX. Applied to college
athletics, “Title IX requires that female and male student-athletes receive
athletics scholarship dollars proportional to their participation . . . .”199 The
dollar amount of full cost of attendance scholarships must be equal between
male and female student-athletes.200 This is unlike Title IX’s equitable
treatment and benefits requirements, which pertain to non-gender related
differences such as the costs of different equipment used by male and female
student-athletes (i.e., football helmets for male student-athletes will cost more

195. Drew, supra note 188.
196. NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADMIN’S (NASFAA), POLICIES & PROCEDURES TOOLS:
READING & INTERPRETING REGULATION & STATUTE 2 (2010), https://www.kctcs.edu/en/Faculty_and_Staff/~/media/B62359988720472ABE36AABDAF00A8D6.ashx.
197. Prisbell, supra note 190.
198. Powers, supra note 184.
199. Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions#how (last visited May 25, 2016).
200. Id.
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than equal quality shin guards for female student-athletes).201
When deciding how to distribute the new full cost of attendance
scholarships, University of North Dakota’s (North Dakota) Deputy Director of
Athletics Daniella Irle illustrates the process of balancing Title IX rules with
competitive recruiting.202 To compete with Big Ten universities at recruiting
men’s hockey players, North Dakota had to adopt the full cost of attendance
scholarship.203 However, once adopted, Irle had to figure out how to allocate a
proportional scholarship amount to female student-athletes.204 In doing so,
athletic directors need to worry about only the dollar amount being equal
between male and female student-athletes.205
2. Profiting from Names, Images, and Likenesses of Student-Athletes
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided O’Bannon, United States
District Court Judge Claudia Wilken ruled that restraints on the amount of
compensation that student-athletes can receive for playing sports and for the use
of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs) are a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.206 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that NCAA amateurism
rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny and that universities should not be
restricted from providing scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.207
However, the Ninth Circuit did not require that student-athletes be paid for the
use of their NILs.208 Instead, it explained that
the district court identified two procompetitive purposes served
by the NCAA’s current rules: “preserving the popularity of the
NCAA’s product by promoting its current understanding of
amateurism” and “integrating academics and athletics” . . . The
question is whether the alternative of allowing students to be
paid NIL compensation unrelated to their education expenses,
is “virtually as effective” in preserving amateurism as not

201. Id.
202. Stefanie Loh, Stipends, Title IX Debated at NCAA Forum, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 25,
2015), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/apr/25/ncaa-inclusion-forum-cost-living-stipend-titleIX/.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015).
207. Id. at 1053.
208. Id. at 1076.
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allowing compensation.
We cannot agree that a rule permitting schools to pay students
pure cash compensation and a rule forbidding them from
paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in
promoting amateurism and preserving consumer demand.209
O’Bannon is a significant driver that lead to the creation of autonomy for
the Power 5 Conferences and the approval to pay student-athletes the full cost
of attendance. As athletic directors calculate how they will allocate and market
full cost of attendance to student-athletes, they also need to prepare for the
possibility of having to pay student-athletes for their NILs. Despite the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, it is unlikely that the debate over student-athlete compensation
for their NILs is finished. Successful athletic directors should still have
contingency plans in place for the possibility of student-athlete compensation
beyond full cost of attendance in the future.
3. Unionization
On March 26, 2014, the NLRB Region 13 Director issued a decision that
Northwestern University grant-in-aid scholarship football players are
employees of Northwestern University.210 The Region 13 Director based his
decision on an analysis of grant-in-aid scholarship football players and their
relationships with Northwestern University under the common law definition of
employee, which “is a person who performs services for another under a
contract of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return
for payment.”211
In the director’s analysis, the services that grant-in-aid scholarship football
players performed were described simply as athletic services performed for
Northwestern University.212 Some of the benefits that Northwestern University
received were revenues from ticket sales and television contracts and other
benefits such as a positive reputation, media exposure, and increased
applicants.213 The compensation that grant-in-aid scholarship football players

209. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955,
1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014)) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984);
Cnty. Of Tuolumne, 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
210. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *8 (2015).
211. Id. at *19.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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received were economic benefits in the form of a scholarship, which covered
tuition, fees, room, board, and books.214 The controls that Northwestern
University exerted over grant-in-aid scholarship football players were
itineraries for training camp and away games, and the monitoring by coaches of
adherence to NCAA and team rules.215
Supporters of college athletes being considered employees include the
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) and the players unions of five
major professional sports leagues (NBA, NFL, NHL, MLB, and MLS).216
Positive aspects of college athlete unionization are that the members of a team
may gain a sense of ownership and create a close bond with teammates.217 On
the other hand, opponents of the NLRB Region 13 decision include the NCAA
and six leaders in Congress.218 NCAA president Mark Emmert described the
“effort to unionize players a ‘grossly inappropriate’ way [of resolving issues] in
college sports.”219 There are many negative ways that unionization can impact
college athletes. One negative impact of unionization is that the bargained-for
benefits college athletes receive will likely violate NCAA rules.220 The NCAA
claimed that declaring college athletes employees will “[u]surp the
responsibilities entrusted to our academic leaders to determine what priority
and role athletics should play in the educational development of the college
students placed in their care.”221 If true, employee status of college athletes may
therefore usurp the responsibilities of athletic directors. Some of the main
responsibilities of athletic directors are to support and encourage the education
of athletes and to uphold university and NCAA policies.
On August 17, 2015, the NLRB dismissed the Region 13 Director’s
decision.222 In the NLRB’s decision and review, it concluded that it should not
assert jurisdiction over only the case involving Northwestern University

214. Id.
215. Id. at *20–21.
216. Jon Solomon, NCAA and Others File Briefs in Northwestern Football Union Effort,
CBSSPORTS
(July
3,
2014),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24606865/ncaa-and-others-file-briefs-in-northwestern-football-union-effort.
217. Todd Jones, College Athletics | Northwestern: ’Cats See On-Field Benefits from Union Talk,
BUCKEYE XTRA SPORTS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/stories/2014/08/03/cats-see-on-field-benefits-from-union-talk.html.
218. Solomon, supra note 216.
219. Eddie Pells, NCAA President Mark Emmert Says Unionization Won’t Solve Problems,
NCAA.COM (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2014-04-06/ncaa-president-markemmert-says-unionization-wont-solve-problems.
220. Solomon, supra note 216.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *7 (2015).
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grant-in-aid scholarship football players.223 The NLRB reasoned that asserting
jurisdiction “would not promote stability in labor relations.”224 Specifically, the
Northwestern University football team was just one of many other teams
governed by the same rules to generate their success.225 Terms applied to
Northwestern University would disrupt its relations with other teams and create
“[in]stability in labor relations.”226 The NLRB emphasized that it had never
before been asked to assert jurisdiction in a case involving college athletes of
any kind, making the case “novel and unique.”227 It discussed how college
athletes are dissimilar from graduate student assistants, student employees, such
as janitors or cafeteria workers, and professional athletes.228
Near the end of its decision, the NLRB made specific note that its order
“does not preclude a reconsideration of this issue in the future.”229 Just as
athletic directors should develop a contingency plan for compensating athletes
for their NILs, athletic directors should prepare for possible student-athlete
unions in the future.
If, in the end, grant-in-aid scholarship football players are considered
employees and are able to unionize, athletic directors will likely have to
consider Title IX implications. Title IX may entitle female student-athletes to
similar benefits even if they are not considered employees and do not participate
in the bargaining process.230
Sexism in the marketplace, such as football generating more revenue than
women’s sports, does not excuse discrimination by universities based on sex.231
Athletic directors cannot allow their athletic departments to provide a higher
quality athletic experience to one sex, even if the higher quality experience is
obtained through collective bargaining.232 If grant-in-aid scholarship football
players are allowed to unionize and obtain benefits such as health insurance
through collective bargaining, then that same benefit must be extended to a
proportionate number of female student-athletes.233 Thus, athletic directors

223. Id. at *3.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *5.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *4.
228. Id.
229. Id. at *6.
230. Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of Northwestern
and O'Bannon, 41 J.C. & U.L. 297, 327–28 (2015).
231. Id. at 326.
232. See id. at 321–31.
233. Id.
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must prepare for the possibility of deciding which female athletes will receive
benefits that are bargained for by grant-in-aid scholarship football players.234
B.

Conference Autonomy

The NCAA Division I Board of Directors adopted a new Division I
governance structure on August 7, 2014.235 Under this new structure, athletic
directors have an increased impact on decision making and additional
responsibilities.236 Athletic directors now make up 60% of the new Division I
Board of Directors and will have a vote on the Board for the first time.237 This
Division I Board of Directors gave sixty-five universities that make up the
Power Five Conferences (SEC, ACC, Big Ten, Pac-12, and Big 12) autonomy
to create their own legislation.238 A proposal goes through four stages before it
becomes legislation.239 First, a concept must be developed and proposed.240
Second, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors, NCAA Division I Council,
or any Division I conference must sponsor the proposal.241 For a proposal
related to Division I football, the proposal can be sponsored by only the Division
I council or an FBS or FCS conference.242 Third, the proposal must be
drafted.243 Fourth, the proposal then goes through a timeline unique to
autonomy universities where the drafted proposal is discussed, reviewed, and
modified before it is finally voted on.244 Each university has one vote; three
student-athletes from each of the Power 5 Conferences are also able to vote.245
The legislation is adopted if one of two scenarios exists.246 The first scenario
requires majority vote of three of the five conferences and 60% of total votes.247
The second scenario requires majority vote of four of the five conferences and

234. Id.
235. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, ADs Key to Restructuring Success, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.ncaa.org/champion/ads-key-restructuring-success.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Jon Solomon, NCAA Adopts New Division I Model Giving Power 5 Autonomy, CBSSPORTS
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24651709/ncaa-adoptsnew-division-i-model-giving-power-5-autonomy.
239. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 5.3.2.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 5.3.2.2.2.1.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. 5.3.2.
244. Id.
245. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.7.1.
246. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.7.2.
247. Id.
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a simple majority of total votes.248
The inherent control of the new governance structure does not give the
Power 5 Conferences absolute authority to do whatever they wish, rather they
are given “authority to adopt or amend legislation that is identified as an area
of autonomy.”249 Areas of autonomy include: Athletics Personnel, Insurance
and Career Transition, Promotional Activities Unrelated to Athletics
Participation, Recruiting Restrictions, Pre-enrollment Expenses and Support,
Financial Aid, Awards, Benefits and Expenses, Academic Support, Health and
Wellness, Meals and Nutrition, and finally, Time Demands.250 Autonomy is a
step toward more balanced and more efficient NCAA governance; athletic
directors and other voting members of the Power 5 Conferences must make
decisions that are within the scope and nature of the relevant area of
autonomy.251
In January 2015, universities in the Power 5 Conferences first voted to
approve increasing scholarship amounts for student-athletes to include the full
cost of attendance.252 Second, they adopted legislation not to cut a
student-athlete’s scholarship for athletic reasons.253 Third, they adopted
legislation to permit student-athletes to borrow against their future earnings
potential through loss-of-value insurance.254
With great power comes great responsibility. In just the first year since
the Power 5 Conferences created the first official proposal to become
autonomous in December of 2014, the group has already created at least
twenty-four additional proposals to amend the NCAA Bylaws.255 The Power 5
Conferences have not yet been able to evaluate the effects of their first adopted
amendments over the course of one year. Although adopted legislation that
allows student-athletes to receive scholarships up to the full cost of attendance
is within the scope of the financial aid area of autonomy, athletic directors might
experience unintended, negative consequences in the form of discontinued

248. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.7.2.
249. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 5.3.2.1.1 (emphasis added).
250. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.2 (a)–(k).
251. Id. art. 4.2.2 (j).
252. Hosick, supra note 174.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See NCAA, OFFICIAL NOTICE OF AUTONOMY PROPOSALS – DIVISION I (2014) (including
Proposals 2014-11through 2014-14); NCAA, 2015-16 DIVISION I AUTONOMY PUBLICATION OF
PROPOSED LEGISLATION (2015), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015-16%20NCAA%
20Division%20I%20Autonomy%20POPL_92515.pdf (including Proposals 2015-15 through 2015-28).
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non-revenue producing sports.256 The millions of dollars that are now used to
cover full cost of attendance must come from somewhere.257
C.

Budget Management and Revenue Generation

The athletic director of today must find ways to generate revenue to keep
pace with rising expenses in university athletic programs. This task is difficult
amidst financially struggling universities. Universities, in general, nearly
doubled the amount of debt that they incurred in the last decade.258 One reason
why universities incur additional debt is because they want to maintain high
levels of spending to increase brand recognition, student demand, and donor
support.259 However, most universities are unable to keep up with their
spending because their revenues are down due to shrinking state educational
funds and declines in attendance.260
Another contributor to this phenomenon is university spending on athletic
programs. Because the vast majority of university athletic programs operate at
a loss, universities contribute subsidies to their respective athletic programs.261
Similar to increasing spending on the academic side of higher education, an
arms race occurs on the athletic side as university athletic programs create new
facilities and upgrade existing ones.262 Syracuse University Athletic Director
Mark Coyle is tasked with updating the aging Carrier Dome.263 Unfortunately,
his budget is tighter than most because private universities, such as Syracuse,
receive little or no state funds for facility upgrades.264
More expenses exist from the costs of students. Unlike the spending on the
academic side of higher education, the ratio of money spent on student-athletes

256. Carter, supra note 187.
257. Powers, supra note 184.
258. Jeffrey J. Selingo, Colleges Struggling to Stay Afloat, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/education/edlife/many-colleges-and-universities-face-financialproblems.html.
259. Tyler Kingkade, College Sports Spending Poses Big Risk to University Budgets, Moody’s
Warns, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/collegesports-budgets_n_4099324.html.
260. Selingo, supra note 259.
261. Kingkade, supra note 260.
262. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE SPORTS 101: A PRIMER ON
MONEY, ATHLETICS, AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16 (2009), http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/2009_KCIA_College_Sports_101.pdf.
263. Chris Carlson, The 7 Biggest Challenges Facing Syracuse’s New Athletic Director, SYRACUSE
(June 18, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/orangesports/index.ssf/2015/06/7_reasons_potential_athletic_directors_might_not_want_the_syracuse_job.html.
264. Id.
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to regular students is lopsided. “The Knight Commission says Division I
schools with football spent $91,936 per athlete in 2010, seven times the
spending per student of $13,628. Division I universities without football spent
$39,201 per athlete, more than triple the average student spending.”265 NCAA
data shows that only 16.2% of spending at Division I football universities goes
to student aid; the rest is disbursed to salaries, game expenses, and facilities.266
With the approval of athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, the
16.2% of Division I spending on student aid will increase.
Taxes are another expense that should concern athletic directors, especially
athletic directors at private universities that are not exempt from income tax
under the broad constitutional doctrine of inter-governmental tax immunity or
section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) like public universities are.267
Private universities and their athletic departments are exempt from paying
corporate income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC.268 Section 501(c)(3)
protects organizations that are both charitable and educational.269 Universities,
by virtue of being educational institutions, fall under a category of organizations
presumed to be charitable by section 501(c)(3).270 Notably, the NCAA is also
exempt because it is an organization that operates in educational activities by
promoting amateur athletics.271 Although the NCAA and university athletic
programs are defined as exempt organizations, there are three operational
limitations that create concern as applied to college athletics.272
The first limitation is unreasonable “private inurement,” which prohibits an
organization from paying unreasonable compensation to members inside the
organization.273 When applying private inurement to college sports, the
compensation received by athletic directors and college coaches is a red flag.
In 2013, David Williams of Vanderbilt University (Vanderbilt) was the highest
paid athletic director in the country; he received $3.23 million from
Vanderbilt.274 Williams’ payout was 629% higher than the average of Division

265. Cliff Peale, Athletics Cost Colleges, Students Millions, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/15/athletics-cost-colleges-students-millions/2814455/.
266. Id.
267. John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 109,
134 (2010).
268. Id. at 113.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 113–14.
271. Id. at 119.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Upton & Berkowitz, supra note 100.

GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

816

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/26/2016 4:50 PM

[Vol. 26:2

I athletic directors.275 Also, it was more than twice as much as the second
highest paid athletic director.276 The highest salary for a college basketball
coach for the 2014–2015 season was $6.55 million paid to John Calipari by
Kentucky, which is 888% higher than the NCAA average of approximately
$737,392.277 Similarly, the highest salary for a college football coach for the
2014–2015 season was $6.9 million paid to Nick Saban by the University of
Alabama, which is 394% higher than the FBS average of approximately $1.75
million.278 “In most instances the college coach is the highest paid state
employee of a public institution . . . .”279 Although earnings of university
athletic program employees seem unjustifiably excessive, they are the market
prices for demanding positions, and therefore, not unreasonable.280
The second limitation is “private benefit,” which can actually apply to
individuals or entities outside the organization or to transactions entered into at
fair market value; the key question is whether or not the benefits to private
individuals or entities excessively outweigh the charitable benefits.281
Applying the private benefit limitation to college sports, one view is that
television networks receive a benefit that greatly exceeds the benefit received
by student-athletes.282 This is unlikely because the television networks’ benefit
comes after the significant price it negotiates for and pays to the NCAA and
university athletic programs. The value received by the NCAA and university
athletic programs is then distributed among the athletes in the form of
scholarships and improved facilities, equipment, or athletic opportunities.
The third limitation is “commerciality,” which may prevent an organization,
even a charity, from receiving the tax exemption if it runs a “significant
commercial business.”283 The key questions related to whether or not a

275. Erik Brady et al., Major College ADs Averaging More than $500,000 in Pay, USA TODAY
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06/college-athletics-directorssalaries-increase/1964239/.
276. Upton & Berkowitz, supra note 100.
277. Jim Baumbach, Huge Performance Bonuses Commonplace for NCAA Basketball Coaches,
NEWSDAY (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-basketball/huge-performance-bonuses-commonplace-for-ncaa-basketball-coaches-1.10095574.
278. Jim Baumbach, Special Report: College Football Coaches' Salaries and Perks Are Soaring,
NEWSDAY (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-football/fbs-college-football-coaches-salaries-are-perks-are-soaring-newsday-special-report-1.9461669.
279. Martin J. Greenberg & Thom Park, CEOs in Headphones—Financial Engineering 3 (2013),
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/CEOs-in-Headphones.pdf.
280. Colombo, supra note 268, at 120–21.
281. Id. at 122.
282. Id. at 125.
283. Id. at 126.
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commercial business is charitable are, whether or not its business is substantial
and if so, whether or not it is in furtherance of an exempt purpose.284 Applied
to college athletics, it is likely that college athletics can be considered
substantial given the media packages, coach and athletic director compensation,
time spent on athletic activities, and hundreds of millions of dollars that flow
through the industry.285 However, whether or not a private university athletic
program is a business in furtherance of the exempt purpose of charity or for
education is less clear because neither the courts nor the IRS provide a clear
explanation of what “in furtherance of” means. One viewpoint is that university
athletic programs and the NCAA are commercial organizations because they
price their products to maximize profits and purchase commercial
advertisements.286 But an opposing viewpoint is that these same profits fund
non-revenue generating sports and student-athlete scholarships.287
There are two pending cases that could also impact costs to university
athletic programs via payments to student-athletes. The first case In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation288 is in settlement discussions at
the time this Article was written. The plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation
are current and former collegiate athletes who sued the NCAA on a class action
basis, claiming that the NCAA breached certain contractual obligations and
common law duties to the plaintiffs in the way it handled student-athlete
concussions and concussion-related risks.289 After conducting extensive
discovery, the parties engaged in a lengthy mediation process.”290 A proposed
settlement of $75 million was rejected by the lead plaintiff Adrian Arrington.291
The second case Jenkins v. NCAA292 is collecting support for a class
action at the time this Article was written. Jenkins contends that any cap on
student-athlete compensation, including up to the full cost of attendance, is
unlawful.293 United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken, who ruled

284. Id. at 127.
285. See id. at 131.
286. Id. at 127.
287. See id. at 128–29.
288. See generally In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig.,
No. 13 C 9116, 2014 WL 7237208 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014).
289. Id. at *1.
290. Id.
291. Jon Solomon, NCPA: Lead Plaintiff in NCAA Concussion Case Opposes Settlement,
CBSSPORTS
(June
9,
2015),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25209963/ncpa-lead-plaintiff-in-ncaa-concussion-case-opposes-settlement.
292. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
293. Daniel A. Kaufman & John G. Long, Keeping Score on NCAA Student-Athlete Rules: Can
Student-Athletes Receive Pay to Play and for Use of Their Names, Images and Likenesses?, NAT’L L.
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against the NCAA in O’Bannon, was assigned to this case.294
In light of current rising costs and threats of future costs looming, successful
athletic directors will find a way to offset the difference. Some strategies are to
slow down facility growth or decrease salaries; however, sometimes those
options are just not realistic.295 An increasing trend is cutting non-revenue
generating sports teams from athletic programs.296 However, this contradicts
an athletic director’s duties to ensure the fiscal integrity of the program and
uphold NCAA principles that promote opportunities for student-athletes, not
take them away.297
Alternatively, the following is a list of suggested revenue generating ideas
by various athletic directors:
1. Group Funds
Some athletic directors propose expansion of the NCAA Student Assistance
Fund.298 The purpose of this fund is to provide student-athletes with up to $500
per semester for minor expenses.299 Most of the money in the fund emanates
the NCAA’s $10.8 billion media rights contract with CBS.300 Expanding this
fund is a reasonable method for athletic directors to increase revenue to help
cover part of the full cost of attendance because the NCAA Student Assistance
Fund is a system that is already in place.301 Similarly, Conference USA created
a $6.3 million pool from which its members may take out up to $450,000 each
at any time over the next three years.302
2. Social Media
The University of Southern California (USC) found success using social

REV. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/keeping-score-ncaa-student-athlete-rulescan-student-athletes-receive-pay-to-play.
294. See generally Jenkins, 311 F.R.D. 532.
295. Carter, supra note 187.
296. Michael Sanserino & Sam Werner, Cost of College Athletics May Rise amid Challenges,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 9, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/2014/06/10/Cost-ofcollege-athletics-may-rise-amid-challenges/stories/201406100048.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Steve Berkowitz & Andrew Kreighbaum, College Athletes Cashing in with Millions in New
Benefits, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/08/18/ncaa-cost--attendance-meals-2015/31904839/.
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media sponsorships in its social media accounts (i.e., Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, etc.).303 USC’s media rights holder Fox Sports said that the revenue
received from these new social media sponsorship agreements is approaching
the “mid-six figures” on an annual basis.304 Although this seems like easy,
sustainable money considering the popularity of social media, IMG College, the
largest college sports marketing company, says that it is still too early to tell.305
However, keeping in mind the uniqueness of college sports and fans’ attitudes
towards tradition, some athletic programs might remain at arms-length from
social media; too much publicity could dilute their brands.
3. Fundraising
It is no secret that athletic directors engage with alumni and donors to
maintain a positive relationship with some of the biggest supporters of the
university athletic program. Athletic directors implement other ways to raise
funds, too. At larger universities, where there is high demand for tickets to
football and basketball games, athletic directors can charge for ticket priority.306
Ticket priority is a payment in the form of a donation by a fan seeking season
tickets; it is paid on top of the normal season ticket price to increase the
likelihood of receiving a premium seat.307 A fair number of fans are willing to
pay the ticket priority price because the extra payment is a donation and it is
80% tax deductible, per IRS guidelines.308
4. Raised Prices:
San Diego State University Athletic Director Jim Sterk decided to raise
ticket prices.309 He informed season ticket holders that basketball ticket prices
would increase to help the athletic program cover the new full cost of attendance
payments.310 Most of the hikes in price were in donor sections increasing price
by 20%.311 Other sections were re-classified to a more expensive section and

303. Michael Smith, Colleges Find Revenue Stream in Social Media, SPORTS BUS. J. (Oct. 12,
2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/10/12/Colleges/College-social-media.aspx.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 263, at 14.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Mark Zeigler, SDSU Ups Cost of Hoops Season Tickets, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/apr/01/cost-increase-sdsu-basketball/.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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increased by 68%.312 Athletic directors should be cautious to avoid upsetting
donors if they use this method. Smaller universities that rarely have the
opportunity to charge a ticket priority fee use more direct methods. In 2015,
Georgia State charged students an athletics fee of $554.313 Student fees are a
practice that athletic directors should tread lightly on.
D.

Institutional Control

It seems like we can count on a new major university athletic scandal
emerging every few years or so. Scandals are extremely harmful to all
stakeholders involved because reputations of individuals and the university
involved may be severely damaged.314 As overseers of their athletic programs,
athletic directors must do all they can to prevent scandals from occurring.
Scandals vary in subject matter, people involved, length of time over which they
occurred, and sanctions imposed.315 This section focuses on major scandals
involving more than just a few rogue individuals. The common denominator of
scandals is that they each violate at least one subsection of the NCAA principle
of Institutional Control and Responsibility, or Bylaw 2.1.316 The principle
broadly states that “[i]t is the responsibility of each member institution to
control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance with the rules and
regulations of the [NCAA].”317 Furthermore, each institution is responsible “for
the actions of its staff members and for the actions of any other individual or
organization engaged in activities promoting the athletics interest of the

312. Id.
313. Brad Wolverton et al., The $10-Billion Sports Tab: How College Students Are Funding the
Athletics Arms Race, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 15, 2015), http://chronicle.com/interactives/ncaa-subsidies-main#id=table_2014.
314. Andy Clayton, Penn State Has Paid More than $92M as a Result of Jerry Sandusky Child Sex
Abuse Scandal: Report, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/college/penn-state-paid-92m-result-jerry-sandusky-scandal-article-1.2447621.
315. See generally FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012), http://progress.psu.edu/assets/content/REPORT_FINAL_071212.pdf; NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2010), https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch?miSearchSubmit=publicReport&key=691; NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2013),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Miami%20Public%20Inf%20Rpt.pdf; NCAA, NOTICE OF
ALLEGATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, CASE NO. 00231 (2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/acc/2015/06/04/north-carolina-tar-heels-ncaa-notice-allegations-football-basketball/28474945/.
316. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 2.1.
317. Id. art. 2.1.1.
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institution.”318 University presidents and chancellors are recognized as the
ultimate authorities of the athletic programs of their institutions.319 However,
athletic directors can be given institutional control alone or shared with the
president or chancellor.320
When athletic directors and compliance personnel do not actively watch
for signs of possible violations, they can unintentionally enable an environment
for scandal. This is exactly what happened at the University of Miami
(Miami).321 The story originally surfaced in a Yahoo! Sports article; the article
was based on an interview with Nevin Shapiro, who was a party to a $930
million Ponzi scheme.322 Shapiro claimed to have provided all types of illegal
benefits like cash, prostitution, jewelry, electronics, nights out at strip clubs, and
access to houses and yachts to student-athletes at Miami.323 In the past, the
NCAA noted that “institutions have a greater responsibility to monitor athletics
representatives with ‘insider’ or favored status.”324 Here, this applied to Miami
because of its relationship with Shapiro, which involved the institution naming
a student-athlete lounge after him, allowing him to lead the football team out of
the locker room, and granting him access to the sidelines during football
games.325 Assessing whether or not the institution lacked control, the NCAA
considered the overall “culture” of the athletic program. 326 It considered
whether or not
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

adequate compliance measures exist;
those compliance measures were appropriately
conveyed to those who need to be aware of them;
the compliance measures are monitored to ensure they
are followed; and
upon learning that a violation may have occurred, the

318. Id. art. 2.1.2.
319. Id. art. 2.1.1.
320. Id. art. 6.01.1.
321. Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to Players,
YAHOO (Aug. 16, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/renegade-miami-football-booster-spells213700753--spt.html.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 316, at 60.
325. Id. at 62.
326. Id. at 56.
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institution takes timely and appropriate action.327

Ultimately, the NCAA determined that Miami lacked institutional
control.328 The NCAA stated that Miami’s compliance measures were
insufficient because many staff members, mainly coaches, reported inconsistent
understanding of several policies, such as how and when to document phone
calls or visits with recruits.329 The continuous lack of proper communication of
policies and lack of monitoring conduct lead to the growth of a culture that did
not value compliance policies and procedures.330 However, Miami claims that
it “went to great lengths” to foster a culture of compliance through rules
education.331 Unfortunately, rules education alone is not enough; several
members of the institution provided a poor understanding of the rules.332 The
culture at Miami seems to suggest that compliance rules were not valued, as
evidenced by the fact that none of the thirty-eight program members involved
in the violations took any steps to report any of the violations.333 In its report,
the NCAA noted that if effective compliance measures were monitored, the
violations could have been prevented or deterred.334 Some specific compliance
measures, mentioned only briefly by the NCAA, included more frequent
documentation of interactions with boosters and recruits, and better systems to
monitor text messages and phone calls.335
In the Miami infractions report, the NCAA mentioned multiple ways in
which athletic program leaders could have taken better steps to create a
pro-compliance culture, mainly by being proactive while monitoring institution
compliance.336 One example is using strategy, such as anticipating where
violations are most likely to occur.337 Another example is following through
with information about a potential violation.338 Advances in technology also
provide easy ways for university athletic programs to monitor themselves.

327. Id. at 57.
328. Id. at 62.
329. See id. at 58.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 59.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 56.
334. See id. at 60.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 57.
337. Id. at 56–60.
338. Id.
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Software from tech company JumpForward features a Compliance Toolbox that
allows compliance departments to easily monitor many different areas of
compliance, such as all phone calls, text messages, and e-mails sent to
prospective student-athletes.339
The sex scandal at Louisville came to light when Katina Powell released
her book entitled Breaking Cardinal Rules wherein she claims to have hired
escorts on twenty-two occasions between 2010 and 2014 for men’s basketball
players.340 She claims that these gatherings were organized by former
Louisville basketball staffer Andre McGee.341 Louisville Head Basketball
Coach Rick Pitino stated that he does not know if it is true.342 Investigations are
ongoing at this time, so it is difficult to determine with certainty who knew and
who was involved. Regardless of the outcome, the allegations alone are enough
to damage the reputation of the athletic program at the University of Louisville.
From an athletic director perspective, the Louisville scandal may serve as
an example of how difficult it is to know every activity of every person
associated with the athletic program. Louisville President James Ramsay
released a statement that reads, “For the past 18 years, Tom Jurich has served
as athletic director of an exemplary program at U of L . . . [he is] committed to
the values that are fundamental to the success of Cardinal athletics.”343 Jurich
was ranked number one in a list compiled of the top twenty-five athletic
directors in the country.344 The rankings consider areas such as athletic success,
stability, national respect, and avoidance of scandals and NCAA issues.345 Even
the most careful, compliant athletic directors are not immune from scandals.
When it comes to major university athletic program scandals, there is a
consistent presence of a culture, not just a few individuals, that does not value
compliance rules. Although the NCAA makes some recommendations in its

339. Compliance Toolbox, JUMPFORWARD, http://www.jumpforward.com/compliance-toolbox/
(last visited May 25, 2016).
340. Anthony Schoettle, Grand Jury Investigating Louisville Basketball Sex Scandal, IBJ (Oct. 30,
2015), http://www.ibj.com/articles/55570-grand-jury-investigating-louisville-basketball-sex-scandal.
341. Id.
342. Jerry Barca, Rick Pitino, The Louisville Sex Scandal and the Scab Pulled back on College
Athletics, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybarca/2015/10/22/rick-pitino-thelouisville-sex-scandal-and-the-scab-pulled-back-on-college-athletics/.
343. Jeff Greer, U of L President Ramsey Preaches Patience, COURIER J. (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://www.courier-journal.com/wlna/sports/college/louisville/2015/10/08/university-of-louisvillepresident-james-ramsey-preaches-patience-for-ncaa-school-investigation-into-book/73588794/.
344. Matt Brown, Top 25 College Athletic Directors, SPORTS ON EARTH (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/152470378/ncaa-best-athletic-directors-rankings. These rankings were released two days before the Louisville scandal became public.
345. Id.
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infractions reports, which are all in hindsight, the recommendations are still
valuable to athletic directors because they provide insight into how to fix
weaknesses in compliance. Athletic directors should learn from their own
mistakes and the mistakes of others as a way to improve their own compliance
strategies. Scandals are a way to lose jobs, donor support, reputation, and the
integrity of the athletic program and university.
V.

CONCLUSION

The athletic director of today plays an expanded role in university
athletic programs. Instead of performing duties focused on socializing with
donors or sitting down with a calendar to create competition schedules, athletic
directors now resemble CEOs and plan capital campaigns, master legal
concepts, and sign multimillion dollar agreements. Athletic directors also now
have more power in NCAA Division I governance through autonomy. There
are several paths to the head athletic director chair, but one is causing a
stir—the business outsider with minimal experience in college sports. The shift
to this path has returned questionable results evidenced by the unsuccessful
tenures of Dave Brandon at Michigan and Stephen Patterson at Texas. Their
lack of success may suggest that the athletic director position requires skills
unique to college sports, such as recognizing where the line is between
university tradition and profits.
Another concept unique to college athletics is the principle of
amateurism. It is the backbone of the college sports model as we know it. Legal
and other regulatory entities like the NLRB are closer than ever to removing
amateurism from the college sports. Athletic directors must uphold these
principles of amateurism by duty in their contracts, but also because of the
danger it poses to non-revenue generating sports, which would likely be
eliminated because their funding would be paid to student-athletes of men’s
basketball and football. Another reason why amateurism is important to athletic
directors is that it sets up the possibility of a scandal if it is not frequently
reinforced and monitored by compliance employees. Finally, in a time where
universities are spending more than ever, athletic directors must find new
revenue streams to obtain sufficient funds to pay student-athletes up to the full
cost of attendance. Between the risks of scandal, collapse of the amateurism
model, and the unique skills required to successfully run a university athletic
program, athletic directors earn every penny.

